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Angry White Males:
The Equal Protection Clause
and "Classes of One"
BY TIMOTHY ZicK•

"'Equal protection'
emphastzes disparity m treatment by a State
between classes of mdividuals whose situations are arguably mdistinguiShable. ni
"[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect
persons, not groups."2

I. INTRODUCTION
ection 1 of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment proVIdes, m part, that "[n]o state shall . deny to
any person withm its Junsdiction the equal protection of the

S

• Tnal Attorney, Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice. J.D. 1992, Georgetown Umversity Law Center. The
op1mons expressed herem are solely those of the author and do not represent the
position of the United States Department of Justice as to any matter. The author
would like to thank Colin Owyang and Rupa Bhattacharyya for therr assistance,
and Madeleme Tiinm for reVIewmg earlier drafts of thiS Article.
1
Ross v Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) (emphasiS added). In Ross, the
Supreme Court refused to find that the Equal Protection Clause mandated an
extension of the rule reqwnng states to appomtcounsel for mdigentdefendants for
appeals as of nght to discretionary state court appeals or appeals to the federal
courts. Id. at 617-18.
2
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200,227 (199S). InAdarand,
the Supreme Court struck down an affirmative action scheme providing financial
mcentives to pnme contractors who hired subcontractors from certam mmority
groups, finding that the scheme VIOlated equal protection. Id. The Court noted that
"all governmental action based on race
should be subjected to detailed judicial
mquuy to ensure that thepersonal nghtto equal protection ofthe laws has not been
mfringed." Id. See also mfra note 224 and accompanymg text.
69
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laws."3 Once considered ''the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments,'~ the Equal Protection Clause has become ''the Court's chief
mstrument for mvalidating state laws."5 Unfortunately, however, as
Professor· Tribe has noted, "[t]he words of the equal protection clause do
not, by themselves, tell us as much as we mght Wish.'>6 Nor does adverting
to the ongmal mtentions of the framers of the Equal Protection Clause
proVIde much gmdance, at least as to specific Issues. The "ongmal
understanding'' of the meanmg of "equal protection" continues to be the
subject of active scholarly debate, and any effort to glean answers to
specific questions from the ambiguous ratification debates IS bound to lead
to frustration. 7
A13 the Constitution and history offer little gmdance as to the substantive meanmg of"equal protection," it has fallen to the Supreme Court to
flesh out a doctnne.8 From the begmnmg, the Court has struggled to
proVIde a coherent framework withm which to analyze challenges to
governmental action brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.
From its ongmal requrrement that legislative classifications merely be

3

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
5
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concumng).
6
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1514 (2d ed. 1988).
As Professor Tribe has stated: "To declare that no state shall 'deny to any person
withm its Junsdiction the equal protection of the laws' ts more to proclrum a
delphic edict than to state an mtelligible rule of dectston." Id.
7
Compare Howard J. Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7
STAN. L. REv 3, 9-10, 17, 23, 37 (1954), and Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth
Amendment Reconszdered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1049,
1054-85 (1956}, and John P Frank & Robert F Munro, The Ongmal
Understanding of"Equa/ Protection ofthe Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421, 44243 (argumg that the Fourteenth Amendment was mtended to eradicate all ractal
distinctions), with RAOUL BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 18-19, 22-23,
163-65, 169, 173, 239 (1977), and MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF
PRINCIPLE 170 (1974), and Alexander M. Bickel, The Ongmal Understanding and
the SegregationDeczszon, 69 HARv.L.REv 1, 12-13, 16-17,46-47,56-58 (1955)
(argumg that the Fourteenth Amendment was pnmarily mtended to
constitutionalize the 1866 Civil Rights Act and to prohibit ractal discnmmation
with regard to particular fundamental nghts only). For a summary ofthts and other
scholarship, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THEFOURTEENTHAMENDMENT 2-3, 63, 123
(1988).
8
See NELSON, supra note 7, at 148-96. Ongmally, it was antictpated that
Congress, not federal Judges, would be enforcmg the Fo~enth Amendment See
CassR. Sunstem, TheAnticastePnnczple, 92MICH.L.REv 2410,2439 (1994).
4
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''reasonable," the Court has groped gradually toward its current analytical
framework under wlnch three (and perhaps more) levels of scrutiny may
apply, depending pnmarily upon the nature ofthe group or class allegedly
discnmmated agamst.9 The current multi-tiered approach auns pnncipally
to separate permiSsible legislative generalizations based upon group
charactenstics from illegitimate generalizations based upon stereotypes or
other Impermissible critena. 10
Notwithstanding the active debate concernmg the ongmal purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause, it IS Widely accepted that the pnncipal aun of
the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eradicate
offiCial antebellum discnmmation against blacks, particularly the so-called
''Black Codes," pursuant to which blacks were treated as a lower or secondclass caste. 11 Although not part ofthe framers' ongtnal design, the Supreme

9

The Court's ongmal conception of"reasonableness" held that no regulatory
proviSion was repugnant to equal protection so long as it "place[d] under the same
[were]
restnctions, and subject[ed] to like penalties and burdens, all who
embraced by its prohibitions." Powell v. Pennsylvarua, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888).
For a discusston of the Supreme Court's current multi-tiered approach to equal
protection, see 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-66 (2d ed. 1992). Some commentators have argued that
m addition to the three commonly used standards of review-rational basts,
mtermediate scrutiny, and stnct scrutiny-the Supreme Court has on occasiOn
applied a fourth standard, sometimes called "rational basts with teeth." See, e.g.,
Gale Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basrs With Bite: Intennediate Scrutiny by Any Other
Name, 621ND. L.J. 779 (1987). At least one Justice contends that there exiSts only
one standard ofrevtew under the Equal Protection Clause. See City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Ltvmg Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452-53 (1985) (Stevens, J., concumng)
(argumg that the Court IS actually applymg a smgle rational basiS standard mall of
its equal protection cases).
10 See ROTUNDA &NOWAK, supra note 9, at 568 ("[T]he court has mcreasmgly
focused upon the concept of equal protection to guarantee that all mdivtduals are
accorded farr treatment m the exerciSe of fundamental nghts or the elimmation of
distinctions based on ImpermiSsible critena."); see Shannon Dean Sexton, Note, A
Custody System Free ofGender Preferences and Consrstent with the Best Interests
ofthe Child: Suggestions for a More Protective and Equitable Custody System, 88
KY.L.J. 761, 784 n.172 (2000) (highlighting illegitimate legiSlative generalizations
based upon ImpermiSsible gender stereotypes or other ImpermiSsible critena m the
child custody context).
11
See Millerv. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 934 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concumng)
("[T]he dnvmg force behmd the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
desrre to end legal discnmmation agamst blacks."); Strauderv West Virginla, 100
U.S. 303, 310 (1879) ("[The Fourteenth Amendment's] rum was agamst
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Court long ago expanded the nght of equal protection to groups other than
racial minorities. 12 Classifications based upon gender and alienage, for
example, now rece1ve some form of "heightened" scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 13 Yet while the composition of the challenged
class has shifted from time to time, the conceptualization of equal
protection as a safeguard agamst disparate treatment of classes of
mdiVIduals whose situations are allegedly mdistingwshable has remamed
thecoreprmctple. 14 Indeed, m the Court's recent Terms, mterclass conflicts
such as affirmative action, legislative distncting, smgle-sex military
education, and anti-gay legiSlation have dommated the equal protection
docket. 15

discnmmation because of race or color."); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) ("The ex1stence of laws m the States where the newly
emanctpated negroes restded, which discnmmated with gross mjustice and
hardship agamst them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this [equal
protection] clause, and by it such laws are forbidden."). See John Hamson,
Reconstructing the Pnvi/eges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1413
(1992), for an explanation of how Black Codes were used to prevent blacks from
enjoymg a wide vanety of social and legal pnvileges available to whites.
12
The Supreme Court has never felt particularly constramed to adhere stnctly
to the ongmal understanding of the framers of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed,
by the 1960s, only Justice John Marshall Harlan continued to evmce senous
concern with the Fourteenth Amendment's ongmal understanding. See Harper v.
Virgmta Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As one
scholar has noted, the Court m the 1970s "scarcely batted a collective eyelash at
extending meanmgful equal protection review to groups-women, aliens, and
nonmarital children-plamly not among the contemplated beneficianes of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History ofModem
Equa/Protection,90MICH.L.REv.213,254(1991).InProfessorKiarman'sview,
the Justices have generally shown ''vlrtual contempt for the mtegrity of the
hlstoncal record." Id. at 253.
13
See Cmg v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender
must serve Important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.''); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376
(1971) (invalidating state statutes denymg welfare benefits to resident aliens).
14
In fact, many raciSts dunng the ratification debates agreed with thiS core
pnnctple. However, these same mdiVIduals attempted to crrcumvent thiS pnnctple
behmd the Equal Protection Clause by argumg that blacks ''were somethmg less
than the full equals of whites.'' See NELSON, supra note 7, at 96-97
15
See United States v. Virgmia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (discussmg smgle-sex
military education); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (discussmg racial
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The text ofthe Equal Protection Clause speaks not ofclasses or groups,
but of''persons."16 Does the clause protect persons qua persons, or only as
members ofidentifiable classes or groups? Is the Equal Protection Clause
concerned with allegations of indivulual mistreatment at all? While most
courts and scholars have mterpreted the clause as a protection agamst group
mistreatment, m Village of Willowbrook v. 0/ech, 17 a little-noticed per
cunam opm10n, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
may be mvoked to challenge zndivzdual clauns ofnustreatment at the hands
of government officials. 18 Olech mvolved a plamtiff who challenged the
deciSion of local offic1als to requrre a thirty-three foot easement as a
condition of connecting property to the mumc1pal water system, while
requirmg only a fifteen foot easement from other property owners. 19 The
Court treated the question presented--whether a "class of one" smgled out
for allegedly arbitrary or capncious treatment may bnng a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause-as havmg been plamly decided by its pnor
precedents.20
With the exception of Justice Breyer, who wrote a bnef concurnng
opwon,21 the Court brushed aside concerns that had been expressed even
by Chief Judge Posner, who authored the Olech opwon m the Seventh
Circuit, that expanding the Equal Protection Clause to cover mdiVIdual
clalms of miStreatment would flood the federal courts with local disputes
between citizens and government officials.22
Pnorto Olech, a split among the federal courts of appeals and, mdeed, a
split withm one of those cirCUits, had developed concernmgthe VIability of
"class ofone" equal protection clauns.23 The United States Court ofAppeals
for the Seventh Circuit expressly held in a trilogy of cases, most recently m
Olech, that an mdiVIdual, regardless of race, gender, ethmcity, or any other
distinguiShmg group charactenstic, who alleged that a government official
treatedhnn adversely compared to others similarly situated, due solely to an

genymandenng); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (discussmg antidiscnmmation protections for homosexuals); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995) (discussmg affirmative action).
16
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
17
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct 1073 (2000) (per cunam).
18 /d. at 1074-75.
19 Id. at 1074.
20
Id. at 1074-75.
21
Id. at 1075.
22
Id. For a discuss10n of Chief Judge Posner's concerns, see m.fra note 73 and
accompanymg text
23 See zn.fra Parts II.A-B.
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"illegitimate arumus," could bnng a clatm pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.24 Just pnor to Olech, however, the
Seventh Circuit held exactly the opposite. In a senes ofopmons, the Seventh
Circuit held that "[d]iscnmmation based merely on zndiVldual, rather than
group, reasons will not suffice" to state a clatm under the Equal Protection
Clause.25 The Sixth Circuit had also held that so-called "classes of one" are
not entitled to bnng an equal protection clatm.26 Relymgpnnctpallyupon the
Supreme Court's equal protection "selective prosecution" case law, which
requtres that a plamtiff clatm either membership m a protected group or
viOlation ofanmdependentconstitutionalnghtto mvoketheEqualProtection
Clause, the Sixth Circuithadheldthat"classes ofone" who allege illegitimate
arumus but who are not smgled out because of membership m a protected
group or because ofretaliation for the exerciSe ofa constitutionally protected
nght do not have a VIable cause ofaction under the Equal Protection Clause.27

24

See Olech v. Village ofWillowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), affdper

cunafn, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000); Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v Indianapolis Bd.

ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d 1179 (7th Cir. 1996); Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176
(7th Cir. 1995). The First and Second Circuits have also held that the Equal
Protection Clause protects an mdividual from a state official who selectively
enforces a law or regulation out ofsheer malice. See Crowley v. Courville, 76 F.3d
47, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that claimS under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be based
upon group membership, the exercise of fundamental nghts, or "malicxous or bad
faith mtentto mJure a person"); Rubmovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 911 (1st Cir.
1995) (allowmg selective enforcement claxm based upon "bad faith or malicious
mtent to mJure," but noting that successful claims should be "infrequent").
25
New Burnham Prame Homes, Inc. v. Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7th
Cir. 1990). See also Herro v. City of Milwaukee, 44 F.3d 550, 552-53 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that personal vendettas agamst mdiVIduals are not actionable under
the Equal Protection Clause);Albnghtv. Oliver, 975 F.2d343, 348 (7th Cir. 1992),
aff'd, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (holding that "'the state's act of smgling out an
mdiv1dual for differential treatment' does not 'itselfcreate the class'" necessary for
application of the Equal Protection Clause (quoting Wroblewsla v. City of
Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 459 (7th Cir. 1992)); Smith v. Town ofEaton, 910 F.2d
1469, 1472 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting equal protection claxm because plamtiff did
not allege class-baseddiscnmmation); Huebschen v. Dep'tofHealth & Soc. SeiVs.,
716 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that equal protection claim must be
based on "intentional discnmmation agamst [the plamtiff] because of Ius
membership m a particular class, not merely [because] he was treated unfairly as
an mdividual").
26
Futerruck v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996).
27
Id. at 1057 In Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), the Supreme
Court held that a plamtiff may state a claxm for selective prosecution under the
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In 0/ech, the Supreme Court put aside the Seventh Circuit's ''vindictive
action" theory and held that a plamtiff need not allege subjective ''bad
faith," "illegitimate anxmus," or mtent to mJure m order to challenge a local
official's conduct under the Equal Protection Clause.28 The Court held that
under its precedents, all that IS requrred to mvoke the Equal Protection
Clause IS that a plamtiff allege arbitrary treatment, as measured agamst
others similarly situated.29 The Supreme Court's holding m Olech portends
the following seemmgly anomalous scenarxo: an mdiVIdual white male,
who clrums only that a government official has pressed upon him a burden
not equally shared by others, mvokmg a constitutional proVISion ongmally
mtended to lift blacks from the second-class caste they occupied after the
Civil War. According to the Supreme Court, it IS a settled pnnciple that the
Equal Protection Clause empowers. an mdiVIdual to fight city hall in federal
court.30 The Court reached this result, however, without even exammmgthe
text of the Equal Protection Clause, the lnstory leading to its adoption, a
century of Junsprudence that has m the mam mterpreted the clause to
prohibit only disparate treatment based upon group or class factors, and
conflicting language m its own precedents. Indeed, the Court, often
criticiZed for its lengthy and fractured op1n1ons, devoted little more than
two pages to tlns Important Issue. The little-noticed per cunam oplDlon
should serve to create significant confusion m the lower courts.
Tlns Article contends that the holding m 0/ech was not dictated by the
Supreme Court's pnorprecedents. Indeed, 0/ech IS contrary to the manner
m wlnch the Court has lnstoncally mterpreted the equal protection
guarantee. The op1n1on, cryptic though it may be, will have a significant
Impact upon equal protection clrums. For example, under 0/ech mdiVIdual
cnmmal prosecutions, employment decisions, andmnumerablezonmg and
other local ordinances could gxve nse to an equal protection clrum.
Part II reVIews the circuit op1n1ons that addressed the smgle-member
class theory pnor to 0/ech, with emphasis on the Seventh Circuit's recent
Equal Protection Clause where the deciS1on to prosecute 1s made either m
retaliation for the exerciSe of a constitutional nght, such as freedom of speech or
relig10n, or because of membership m a vulnerable group. Id. at 608. See also
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) {holding that selective enforcement
clauns may be based upon arbitrary classifications).
28
See 0/ech, 120 S. Ct at 1075. Only Justice Breyer found the presence of
allegations of bad faith s1gnificant He stated m a concurrmg opwon that the
"added factor'' of ill will was "sufficient to mlillil11Ze any concern about
transformmg run-of-the-mill zonmg cases mto cases of constitutional nght." Id.
(Breyer, J., concurrmg).
29
Id. at 1074-75.
30

See zd.

KENTUCKYLAWJOURNAL

76

[VOL.89

case law, as that court has offered the most explicit JUstification for
bnngmg the vmdictive action cases withm the Equal Protection Clause.31
Part m analyzes, m broad terms, the "ongmal understanding'' of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Not surpnsmgly, the framers andratifiers did not
consider, much less settle, whether an mdiVIdual could resort to the Equal
Protection Clause m cases where government officials allegedly treated
him arbitrarily. What the framers did establish, however, and what the
Court had for a century pnor to Olech seemed to accept, IS that the
pnnc1pal goal of the equal protection guarantee was to prohibit legislation
that, like the Black Codes, had the effect of creating a subordinate or
subJugated caste of citizens unequal under the law. Thus, from the
begmnmg, the Equal Protection Clause was concerned with the legitimacy
of differential treatment afforded to similarly situated groups of persons.32
Part IV exammes the Supreme Court's equal protection framework and
the pnnc1pal theoretical paradigms that the Court's equal protection cases
have spawned m the academic literature. Notwithstanding occasional
statements concemmgthe ''personal" nature ofthe nghts guaranteed by the
Equal Protection Clause, scholars have noted that the framers' focus on
illegitimate classifications and subJugation of members of certam groups
1s the dommant mediating pnnc1ple underlymg the Supreme Court's equal
protection Junsprudence.33
Part V concludes that the onginal understandin~ ofthe equal protection
guarantee, the Supreme Court's subsequent delineation of the meanmg of
equality, and the theoretical underpmnmgs of the equal protection
guarantee do not support extending the Equal Protection Clause to smglemember classes who allege differential treatment based upon mdividual
factors. While ultimately mvolvmg "personal" nghts, m the sense that an
mdiVIdual always IS harmed or benefitted by governmental action, "equal
protection" 1s bound up mtrinstcally with the notion of group classification-a notion that does not permit the mdiVIdual VIctim of every alleged
mstance ofrmstreatment to invoke its guarantee. The Court's extension of
equal protection m Olech removes any vestige of a mediating pnnciple
from the Equal Protection Clause, Imperils the pnnciples of separation of
powers and federalism, and tnVIalizes the Fourteenth Amendment by
constitutionalizmg and federalizmg every local dispute between a citizen
and a government offic1al.34

31

See mfra notes 36-121 and accompanymg text
See mfra notes 122-51 and accompanymg text.
33 See mfra notes 152-216 and accompanymg text
34
See znfra notes 217-310 and accompanymg text
32
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Finally, Part VI argues that the allegations m Olech and sunilar cases
are more properly the subject of the Due Process Clause, m particular its
substantive component, winch has traditionally been VIewed by the
Supreme Court as the constitutional proVIsion that protects mdiVIduals
from arbitrary governmental action. Concerned that the Federal Constitution could be read to supplant state law, however, the Supreme Court has
made clear in its substantive due process cases that, with regard to
executive acts, only conduct that can be smd to "shock the conscience" IS
subject to constitutional rebuke. Moreover, tlns Article argues that "class
of one" clmms threaten to supenmpose the federal constitution on state
administrative law. Thus, if these clmms are to be allowed under Olech,
they should be subject to the same exacting conscience-shocking standard
as are substantive due process clmms. Under that standard, only conduct
that IS arbitrary m the constitutional sense would be actionable under the
Equal Protection Clause.35
II. "VINDICfiVE ACTION" AND EQUAL PROTECTION

In its recent trilogy of ''vindictive action" cases, the Seventh Circuit
held that the Equal Protection Clause protects a person who alleges that
a state actor withheld a benefit or enforced a law or regulation out of
spite or illegitimate animus.36 The First and Second Circuits have also
embraced the notion that an mdivtdual has a nght under the Equal
Protection Clause to be free from ''malicious" or ''bad faith" governmental action.37 The Sixth Circuit, feanng that such a ruling would cause
disputes between local adm1n1strators andcitizensto overwhelm the federal
courts, has held that a "class of one" cannot mvoke the Equal Protection
Clause absent one ofthe crrcumstances Identified by the Supreme Court as
a basts for a Fourteenth Amendment "selective prosecution" clmm-1.e.,

35

See znfra notes 311-51 and accompanymg text
See znfra Part II.A. While the ''vindictive action" theocy has been embraced
by different panels of the Seventh Circuit, it IS by no means clear that the theocy lS
accepted by the entire cirCuit. Esmail and its progeny appear to be m conflict with
other Seventh Circuit precedent See Herro v. City ofMilwaukee, 44 F.3d 550, 552
(7th Cir. 1995) ("A person brmgmg an action under the Equal Protection Clause
must show mtentional discnmmation agamst hun because oflns membership m a
particular class, not merely that he was treated unfarrly as an mdiv1dual." (quoting
NewBurnhamPrameHomesv. VillageofBurnham,910F.2d 1474,1481 (7thCir.
1990)).
37
See supra note 24 and accompanymg text
36
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a claun ofmemberslnp in a protected group or VIolation of a constitutional
nght.3&

A. The Seventh Circuit Trilogy-The Indivzdual Right to Equality
The Seventh Circuit's trilogy of''vmdictive action" equal protection
cases began with Esmail v. Macrane.39 In Esmail, a liquor dealer alleged
that the mayor of Naperville, Dlinms saw to it that lns application to
renew a retail liquor license was demed. The dealer obtamed a state court
order granting the license renewal, then sued the mayor m federal
court under the Equal Protection Clause, allegmgthat the mayor had forced
lnm to spend $75,000 m legal fees out of"deep-seated annnosity'' toward
lnm.40 The mayor's alleged "campmgn of vengeance" was attributed
pnmarily to the dealer's past success m getting a liquor license revocation changed to a bnef suspensiOn and the dealer's withdrawal of political
support from the mayor. 41 In lns complamt, the dealer alleged that the
city routinely renewed the liquor licenses of others guilty of snnilar, ifnot
more senous, mfractions of the law, and derued lns application "for the
sole and exclusive purpose of exacting retaliation and vengeance" agamst
Jnm.42

The distnct court disnnssed the equal protection cause of action for
failure to state a claun.43 The Seventh Circuit, m an opinion authored by
Clnef Judge Posner, reversed.44 The court acknowledged that the case did
not fit mto the two common lands of equal protection cases: those
mvolvmg "charges of smgling out members of a vulnerable group, racial
or othel'Wlse, for unequal treatment,'' and those mvolvmg "challenges to
laws or policies alleged to make rrrational distinctions.'~5 Nor did the case,
the court noted, fit the usual mode of selective prosecution cases ''where
the decisiOn to prosecute IS made either m retaliation for the exercise of a
constitutional nght, or because ofmemberslnp m a vulnerable group.•>%
Rather, the distinctive feature ofthe plamtiff's claun was that the unequal

38
39

See mfra notes 94-117 and accompanymg text.

Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at-178.
4t Id.
42Jd.
43
Id. at 177
44
Id. at 180.
45
Id. at 178.
46
ld. at 179.
40
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treatment was alleged to have been the result solely of a vmdictive
campmgn by the mayor.47
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits government actions taken for illegitimate or wholly :rrrational
objectives, regardless of whether the VICtim of those actions IS a member
of a protected group. The court found ample room under the equal
protection umbrella for ''vindictive action'' clmms brought by mdiVIdual
plamtiffs.48 The court stated that "[i]fthe power of government IS brought
to bear on a harmless mdiVIdual merely because a powerful state or local
official harbors a malignant arumosity toward him, the mdiVIdual ought to
have a remedy m federal court.'~9 This prmc1ple, the court stated, was
"implied,50 by the Supreme Court m City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Lzvzng
Center, Inc., 51 m which the Court held that requmng a special use permit
for a proposed group home for the mentally retarded VIolated the Equal
Protection Clause because it appeared to rest solely upon an :rrrational
preJudice agmnst the mentally retarded.52 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the abuse charged by Esmail was "remote from the pnmary
concern of the framers of the equal protection clause.''53 Nevertheless, the
court observed that the clause "neither m terms norm mterpretation IS •
limited to protecting members of identifiable groups.''54 Indeed, the court
concluded, "[a] class of one IS likely to be the most vulnerable of all, and
we do not understand therefore why it should be denied the protection of
the equal protection clause.,55

47

Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 180.
49 Id. at 179.
so Id.

48

51

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Ltvmg Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Id. at 450.
53 Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180.
52

54

Id.
ss Id. The court acknowledged that pnor Seventh Circuit precedents appeared
to hold that a class must have more than one member for discnmmation agamst the
class to count as a demal of equal protection. Id. But the court noted that other
crrcuit opmtons had "pomt[ed] out sensibly that classifications should be
scrutinized more carefully the smaller and more vulnerable fhe class IS." Id. Indeed,
Esmail was not the Seventh Circuit's first foray mto the class of one debate. In
Ciechon v. City ofChlcago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982), the Seventh Circuit
allowed a class ofone equal protection clrum to go forward. Ciechon mvolved two
paramedics Identically responsible for the death of a patient, yet only one was
disciplined and the city could not provide a reason for the difference m treatment
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In the second case m the Seventh Circuit trilogy, Indiana State
Teachers Ass 'n v. Indianapolis Board ofSchool Commrss10ners,S6 the court
rebuffed a uruon's effort to mvoke Esmail. The uruon complamed that the
Indianapolis school board, m the absence of any statutory collective
bargammg scheme, had signed a succession ofcontracts withanotheruruon
to be the exclusive bargammg representative of the school system's nonteacher employees and would not permit an election for a collective
bargammgrepresentative. Theplamtiffuruon asserted that the school board
was thus discnmmating between two sunilarly situated entities m VIolation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The school
board argued that the uruon could not mvoke the Equal Protection Clause
because it did not allege discnnunation agamst a class.57 The Seventh
Circuit, agam speakmg through Chief Judge Posner, reaffirmed that
"[w]hile the pnncipal target ofthe equal protection clause IS discrumnation
agamst members of vulnerable groups," a protected class for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause may consist of a smgle member.58 ChiefJudge
Posner wrote:
The equal protection clause does not speak of classes. A class, moreover,
can consist ofasmgle member.. or of one member at present; and it can
be defined by reference to the discnmmation itself. To make "classification" an element of a dental of equal protection would therefore be
vacuous. There IS always a class.59
The court went on to state that Esmail applies only when the government Is treating unequally ''persons who are pnma facie Identical m all
relevantrespects.•>60 In the case oftheuruons, however, the court concluded
that the government was ''treatingunequallytwo persons that [were] pnma
facie unequal in a rationally relevant respect.'>6 1 On the one hand, there was
the uruon with which the government had been dealing contentedly for
many years. On the other, there was the plamtiffuruon, which Wished not
only to break up the cozy eXIsting relationship, but also to change the

Id. at522-24.
56

Indiana State Teachers Ass 'n v. Indianapolis Bd. ofSch. Comm 'rs, 101 F.3d
1179 (7th Cir. 1996).
51
Id. at 1180.
58
Id. at 1181.
59
Id. (citations omitted).
60

61

Id.
Id. at 1182.
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means by which a favored umon would be chosen m the future. 62 Under
these crrcumstances, the court held that ''the equal protection clause 1s
mapplicable because the plamtiff is askmg for a reVISIOn of policy rather
than for a restoration of equality.'~3 In sum, the court concluded that
"[t]here IS nothing rrrational or VIciOus aboutprefernngthe known quantity
to the unknown.' 164
Notwithstanding its assurance that single member classes couldmvoke
the Equal Protection Clause, the Seventh Circuit warned that not every
slight suffered at the hands of local government offictals was subject to
revtew m federal court:
The concept of equal protection IS trlVIalized when it IS used to subject
every deciSiOn made by state or local government to constitutional review
by federal courts. To decide IS to choose, and ordinarily to choose
between-to choose one suppliant, applicant, petitioner, protester,
contractor, or employee over another. Can the loser m the contest
automatically appeal to the federal courts on the ground that the deciSion
was arbitrary and an arbitrary deciSIOn treats likes as unlike and therefore
demes the equal protection of the laws? That would constitutionalize the
Admmtstrative Procedure Act and make its proviSiOns bmding on state
and local government and enforceable m the federal courts.65

The court was concerned that the plamtiff umon was requesting that it
adjudicate a difference of op1n1on as to the appropnate policy the school
board should follow with regard to its process of labor relations and
competitive btdding.66 According to the court, reVIew ofthe school board's
declSlon for vtolation of equal protection was beyond the purview of
federal courts, ''which would be operating without any gwdance other than
what nnght be thought unplicit m the idea of arbitrary governmental
action.'~7

In the third case, Olech v. Village ofWillowbrook,68 which ultimately
made its way to the Supreme Court, a homeowner alleged that the village

62

Id. at 1181-82.
Id. at 1182.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1181.
66
See zd. at 1181-82:
67
Id. at 1181.
68
Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), ajj'dper
cunam, 120 S. Ct 1073 (2000).
63
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of Willowbrook delayed proVIsion of water semces for three months
because she would not agree to a thnty-three foot easement to permit the
village to wtden the street, m lieu of the usual fifteen foot easement
requrred for hookup to the water mam. The homeowner alleged that the
city's demand for a Wider easement and the associated delay were m
retaliation for her earlier, successful property damage suit agamst the city 69
The distnct court dismtssed the homeowner's equal protection chum
because she did not allege an "'orchestrated campmgn of official
harassment' motivated by 'sheer malice. '"70 Butthe Seventh Circuit, Chief
Judge Posner agam writing for the panel, smd that:
[N]othmg m theEsmail op111lon, however, suggests agenera/requrrement
of"orchestration" m vmdictive-action equal protection cases, let alone a
legally significant distinction between "sheer malice" and "substantial ill
will," if, as alleged here, the ill willis the sole cause of the action of
wluch the plamtiff complams.71

It was enough, the court smd, that the city failed for three months to
perform its obligation to provtde a water hookup "for no reason other than
a baseless hatred.m2
Agam, however, the Seventh Circuit votced some reservations with
regard to the possible consequences of its portentous holdings m Esmail
and Indiana State Teachers' Ass 'n. Chief Judge Posner wrote:
Of course we are troubled, as was the district JUdge, by the prospect of
turrung every squabble over murucipal services, of which there must be
tens or even hundreds of thousands every year, mto a federal constitutional case. But bear m mxnd that the 'vmdictive action' class of equal
protection cases requrres proof that the cause of the differential treatment
of which the plamtiff complams was a totally illegitimate ammus toward
the plamtiff by the defendant. If the defendant would have taken the
complamed-of action anyway, even if it didn't have the ammus, the
anxmus would not condemn the action; a tincture of ill will does not
mvalidate governmental action.73

69

Id. at 387-88.
Id. at388 (quoting Esmail v Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995)).
7t Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
70
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The First and Second Circuits have also embracedsmgle-memberclass
''vindictive action" chums under the Equal Protection Clause. The First
Circuit allows a plamtiff to establish an equal protection VIolation with
eVIdence of''bad faith or malicious mtent to mJure."74 While noting that
vmdictive action cases will be "infrequent"75 and that the malice standard
should be "scrupulously met,"76 the First Circuit permits such equal
protection clalills to survive summary Judgment, at least where there IS
eVIdence of a "malicious orchestrated campaign causmg substantial
harm.'m Similarly, the Second Circuit has permitted "selective enforcement" of equal protection clalillS where a plamtiff can demonstrate that a
government official maliciously smgledhlm or her out with bad faith mtent
to mJure.78

B. The Opposzng View-One zs Not Enough

In 1995, the same year Esmail breathed life mto "classes of one"
allegmg ''vindictive action" under the Equal Protection Clause, a different
panel ofthe Seventh Circuit strongly suggested that an mdiVIdual clmmmg
to be the vtctim of a personal vendetta does not state a cla1I11 under the
clause. In Hen-o v. City of Milwaukee,19 a disappomted applicant for a
tavern license filed an action cla1Illmg that hls equal protection nghts had
been VIolated. The plamtiff alleged that a city alderman acted to block hls
application out of sheer an1Illosity or preJudice.80 The Herro court
acknowledged that some "older cases" from the crrcuit suggested that a

74

Rubmovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 911 (1st Cir. 1995).

1s Id.
76 Id.
77

Id. at 912.
Crowley v. Courville, 76 F.3d 47, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1996). Classes of one may
be entitled to brmg therr equal protection clanns m the First and Second Circuits,
but to state that a ''vmdictive action" chum Irught ultimately prevail m either the
First or Second Circuit IS another matter entirely. See, e.g., Rubznovitz, 60 F.3d at
911 (affirmmg grant of summary JUdgment because evidence of malice was
msuffi.cient); FSKDrug Corp. v. Perales, 960 F.2d 6, 10 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirmmg
8rant of SUIWnary Judgment because evidence of malice was msuffic1ent);
Verardi's Moody St Restaurant& Lounge, Inc. v. Bd. of Selectmen, 878 F.2d 16,
20-21 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that mdividual defendants were entitled to qualified
unmunity); LeClaJI v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversmg
JUdgment for plamtiff at tnai because eVIdence of malice was msufficient).
79
Herro v. City ofMilwaukee, 44 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 1995).
80
Id. at 551.
78

84
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"class of only one" could state an equal protection claun,81 but stated that
its "more recent cases
place additional burdens on plamtiffs to Identify
the classification behmd . a 'class of one.' " 82 The court suggested that
plamtiff's clarm would have been stronger had he alleged "a classification
consisting of all members of the Herro family applymg for new tavern
licenses."83 In any event, the court held that defendants had offered rational
reasons for the demal of the tavern license, which was all that the Equal
Protection Clause requrred. 84
The "more recent" cases referred to by the Herro court explicitly held
that a "class of one" could not bnng an equal protection clann. In Smith
v. Town of Eaton,85 for example, the Seventh Circuit stated that a
white police officer's clann that his dismtssal VIolated the Equal Protection Clause "border[ed] on the fnvolous." 86 Plamtiff clauned that while
the town board had Information regarding similar complamts lodged
agamst two other officers, it did not suspend or dismtss them.87 Quoting
one of its earlier precedents, the court noted that "[a]n equal protection
claun must be based on 'intentional discnmmation agamst [the plamtiff] because of his membership m a particular class, not merely [because]
he was treated unfmrly as an mdiVIdual.' " 88 As the plamtiff did not allege
such class-based discnmmation, the court held that his clann could not
stand.89
In New Burnham Prame Homes, Inc. v. Village ofBurnham,90 landowners and a developer asserted that the Village ofBurnham's demal of a
building permit VIolated the Equal Protection Clause.91 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the plamtiffs' Equal Protection Clause claun lacked merit

81

Id. at 553. The court cited Falls v. Town ofDyer, 875 F.2d 146 (7th Cir.
1989), which held that a class of only one member can state a claun under the
Equal Protection Clause if the plamtiff can show that a combmation of legiSlative
and executive action has smgled hun out for uruque treatment Id.
82
Herro, 44 F.3d at 553.
83 Id.
84

Id.

85

Smith v. Town of Eaton, 910 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1990).

86

Id. at 1472.
87 Id.
88

Id. (citations omitted).

89

Id. at 1473.

90

New Burnham Prame Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474
(7th Cir. 1990).
91
Id. at 1475-76.

2000-2001]

"CLASSES OF ONE"

85

because the "plamtiffs [did] not allege that they [were] smgled out because
they belong to any particular class.•>92 The court set forth the governing
standard for equal protection clauns: "In order to assert a constitutional
claun based on VIolation of equal protection, a complammg party must
assert disparate treatment based on therrmembership m a particular group.
Discnmmation based merely on mdividual, rather than group, reasons will
not suffice.',g3
In accord with tlns group of Seventh Circuit opwons IS Futermck v.
Sumpter Townshzp, 94 m which the Sixth Circuit reJected what amounted to
a "malictous enforcement" claun.95 The plamtiff, who owned a trailer park,
sued a Michigan official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a VIolation ofhis nght
to equal protection, allegmg that the official had selectively enforced state
envrronmental regulations, delayed a sewer hookup "maliCiously'' and in
''bad faith," and consprred with the township to charge an exorbitant sewer
hookup fee. 96
The district court dismssed theplamtiff's equal protection claun.97 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed.98 The court reVIewed the law concernmg the
doctrme of selective enforcement, under which a plamtiff may have a
VIable equal protection claun if the dectsion to enforce the law IS made
either m retaliation for the exerciSe of a constitutional nght or because of
membership m a vulnerable group.99 Futermck,.the court noted, did not
claun to be a member of any group; nor did he claun that he was bemg
puniShed for exerctsmg a constitutionalnght. The Sixth Circuit did not cite
Esmail, but it expressly declined to accept plamtiff's "class of one" equal
protection theory 100 The Sixth Circuit relied pnncipally on Oyler v.
Boles, 101 m which-according to the Sixth Circuit-the Supreme Court
"mention[ed] only arbitrary classifications as a basis for selective
enforcement liability."102 The Sixth Circuit went on to say that it"[did] not

92

Id. at 1481-82.
Id. at 1481.
94
Futenuckv. SumpterTownshtp, 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996).
95 See zd. at 1060.
96
Id. at 1052-54.
97
Id. at 1052.
98 Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to all chums except the Distnct Court's
finding of Eleventh Amendment lDlDlUnity for some defendants. I d.
99
Id. at 1056 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
100
Id. at 1057-60.
101
Oylerv. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
102
Futemzck, 18 F.3d at 1058 (citations omitted).
93
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believe that choosmg to enforce the law agamst a particular mdiVIdual is
a 'classification' as that term ts normallyunderstood" 103
The Sixth Circuit's difficultywith theplamtiff's claun went beyond the
nature of the odd-lookmg "class" plamtiff purported to represent. There
were federalism and separation of powers concerns as well. 104 The
Futernzck court set forth several "compelling reasons that the sundry
motivations of local regulators should not be policed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, absent the mtent to
harm a protected group or pumsh the exercise of a fundamental nght." 105
First, the court was discouraged by the "sheer number of possible cases"
and the effect on the efficiency of state and local admmtstrators. 106 As the
court explamed:
LegiSlatures often combme tough laws with limited funding for enforcement A regulator IS requrred to make difficult, and often completely
arbitrary, deciStons about who will bear the brunt of finite efforts to
enforce the law. As a result, even a moderately artful complamt could
pamt almost any regulatory action as both selective and mean-sprrited.l07

The court acknowledged that some crrcuits, most notably the First and
Second, had purported to solve this dilemma by limiting the availability of
actions grounded upon a regulator's malice to those m which a plamtiff is
able to prove that others who are Similarly situated "in all relevant aspects"
have not been regulated. 108 Although the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
this approach allows only cases of "extraordinary selectivity to state a
claim," it nevertheless reJected the approach as a screenmg deVIce because
"[d]etermmmg 'all relevant aspects' of similar situations usually depends
on too many facts (and too much discovery) to allow dismtssal on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion."109 The court concluded that "[i]fwe requrre defendants
to wait until summary Judgment, we burden local and state officials with
103

Id. The court relied on Webster's dictionary to support its determmation that
classes of one are, m fact, not "classes" at all for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 417 (1986)
(deflnmg "classify" as "to group or segregate m classes that have systematic
relations usually founded on common properties or characters; sort'').
104
See Futemzck, 78 F.3d at 1058.
lOS

Id.

106 Id.
101 Id.
108

Id. (quoting Rubmovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir. 1995)).

109 Id.
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the regular prospect of 'fishing expeditions' and meritless suits. In the
meantime we federalize andconstitutionalize what are essentially Issues of
local law and policy.mlo
Second, from a theoretical standpomt, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
"[t]he nature of the right to equal protection also counsels agamst
expanding a federal nght to protection from non-group animosity on the
part of local of:fic1als."m The court pomted out that perfectly random
enforcement of a law would not Implicate the Equal Protection Clause. 112
Similarly, the court stated, "the presence of personal animosity should not
tum an otherwise valid enforcement action mto a VIolation of the
Constitution."113 The court explamed:
From a constitutional perspective, personal arumosity not related to group
tdentity or the exerciSe of protected nghts IS as random as the roll of a
dice. There 1S no constitutionally Significant category of people that have
a greater or lesser chance of bemg affected by it The Constitution's
protection begms only when the znczdence of the burden of regulation
becomes constitutionally suspiCIOus. 114

It was, then, the wholly arbitrary or ''random" nature ofpersonal animosity
that, m the Sixth Circuit's VIew, rendered the Equal Protection Clause
mapposite. 115
Although the Sixth Circuit hastened to add that it did not condone the
abuse of local or state regulatory power, describmg such abuse as
"repugnant to the Amencan tradition of the rule oflaw," the court went on
to state that local governments were in the best position to correct for any
abuse through the "political processes that appomted [the] regulator m the
first place.'m 6 Further, a plamtiff could seek redress m state courts and
under state constitutions. "Absent a breakdown m the state's normal
political process that unfarrly affects a protected group or the exercise of
constitutional nghts, we can and should trust states to police adequately
therr own processes." 117
110

Id. at 1058-59 (footnote omitted).

111

Id. at 1059.

112

See zd.

113

Id.

114Jd.
liS Id.
116 Id.

111Jd.
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In Olech, 118 however, the Supreme Court went even further than had the

Seventh, First, and Second Circuits m therr "class of one" precedents,
consequently disregarding the Sixth Circuit's concerns for allowmg
"fishing expeditions."119 The Court did not reach the pnnciples of
"illegitimate anunus" or "intent to lDJure" relied upon by those courts to
limit the scope of the "class of one'' theory Rather, the Court held that
mdiv1<lual mistreatment by local government officials could be challenged
under the federal constitution regardless of the motivation behmd the
conduct.120 Henceforth, a plamtiff who wiShes to proceed m federal court
under the Equal Protection Clause need only allege that a government
official has acted arbitrarily or rrrationally, and has treated the plamtiffless
favorably than those similarly situated. 121 The Supreme Court's apparent
resolution of the crrcuits' divergence m VIews as to the purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause (i.e., whether the clause was mtended to protect
not only groups but also "classes of one") merits exammation of the
ongmal purpose of the clause.
ill. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING: STRIKING AT CASTES

As noted, the mtended scope of the protections afforded by the Equal
Protection Clause 1s a matter of ongomg scholarly debate. The debates of
the Thuty-Ninth Congress, whlch ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, are
far too ambiguous to settle many Important questions such as whether the
framers of the Equal Protection Clause. mtended to procure for blacks
political or social equality on a broad scale or, more narrowly, to secure for
them only those nghts enumerated m the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 122 They
certamly do not tell us whether the architects of the clause mtended to
extend "equal protection" to a so-called "class of one." No one m the
Thirty-Ninth Congress considered whether an mdiVIdual could challenge
government action motivated by alleged illegitimate animus under the
Equal Protection Clause. The concerns of the time, whlch mcluded the
plight of the newly-freed slaves m the aftermath of a Civil War fought, m
part, to render them free, were far weightier.
Although answers to specific questions are rarely found m the ongmal
debates, considered m broader terms the mtent of the framers IS readily

118

119

Village ofWillowbrook v. Olecb, 120 S. Ct 1073 (2000) (per cunam).

See supra notes 94-117 and accompanymg text
0/ech, 120 S. Ct at 1074-75.
121
See zd. at 1075.
122
See supra note 7 and accompanymg text
120
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discernible. As Professor Sunstem has noted, "[t]he Civil War Amendments were based on a wholesale reJection of the supposed naturalness of
racial hierarchy.
An nnportant purpose of the· Civil War Amendments
was the attack on racial caste."123 The Thirteenth Amendment, ratified m
1865, formally abolished slavery and represented Congress' first constitutional and legislative attack on the caste system. 124 Although the Thirteenth
Amendment formally abolished slavery, Congress was confronted after the
amendments ratification by activities m several mtransigent southern states
that sought to re-establish many of the badges of mfenority mcident to
slavery. In thewmterof 1865-66, southern states enacted what were known
as the ''Black Codes," many ofwhich prohibited blacks from ownmg land,
voting, engagmg m any activity other than domestic service, or leavmg
therr JObs without suffenng the forfeiture of earned pay. 125 'fo many m the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, the Black Codes were symbolic of an unrepentant
South seeking to return to a caste system under which blacks continued to
occupy the mfenor status nnposed by the mstitution of slavery 126
Pnor to seeking a constitutional amendment to remedy the situation,
Congress tnedits hand at a legislative solution. On Apri19, 1866, Congress
overrode President Andrew Johnson's veto ofthe Civil Rights Act ofl866,
which expressly proVIded the nght to "citizens, of every race and color'' to
make and enforce contracts, be parties m court, to own and convey real and

123

Sunstem, supra note 8, at2435 (footnote omitted). Professor Sunstem traces
the ongms ofthe anticaste pnnctple to the ongmal frammg of the Constitution. He
pomts out that "the Constitution forbtds titles ofnobility and that an tmportant part
ofthe founding creed mvolved the reJection of monarchical heritage, largely on the
ground that monarchy made caste distinctions among fundamentally equal human
bemgs." Id. at 2434-35. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)
(stating that the legtslature should not enact "unJust and partial laws" that operate
"to the mJury of the pnvate nghts of particular classes of citizens").
124
The Thirteenth Amendment provtdes, m part: "[n]either slavery nor mvolunta:ry servitude, except as a purushment for cnme whereof the party shall have
been duly convtcted, shall extst withm the United States, or any place subJect to
thetr JUriSdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,§ 1. For a discusston of the events
leading to the passage ofthe ThtrteenthAmendment, see G. Sidney Buchanan, The
Quest for Freedom: A Legal History ofthe Thzrteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L.
REv 1 (1974).
125
See Aremona G. Bennett, Phantom Freedom: Officzal Acceptance of Violence to Personal Security and Subverszon ofPropnetary Rights and Ambitions
Followzng Emanczpation, 1865-1910,10 CHI.-KENTL. REv 439,453-61 (1994).
126
See Davtd F Forte, Spzritual Equality, The Black Codes and the Amencamzation ofthe Freedmen, 43 LoY. L. REv 569,604-09 (1998).
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personal property, to enJOY the full benefit of all laws for the security of
person or property enJoyed by white persons, and to be subject to like
purushm.ent and none other. 127 Many Republicans m Congress believed that
the Civil Rights Act was beyond the constitutional power of Congress. 128
There was also Widespread concern that the nghts enumerated m the Civil
Rlghts Act ought not be left to the discretion of future Congresses. 129
The Fourteenth Amendment, which had been under consideration for
two months pnorto Johnson's veto, was designed pnncipallyto protect the
Civil Rights Act from constitutional attack. 130 Representative John
Bingham ofOh10 first set forth the "equal protection" language that would
ultimately appear m section 1 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment m a proposed
amendment that would have granted to Congress the power ''to pass all
necessary and proper laws to secure to all persons m every State of the
Uruon equal protection m therr nghts, life, liberty, and property " 131
Bingham himself was not particularly clear with regard to the mtended
purpose of the proposed amendment, but participants m the debate
understood Bingham's language to prohibit only laws that smgled out
certam classes of persons for spectal benefits or burdens. 132 Like many
others, Senator William Pitt Fessenden ofMame, the conservative leader
of the Republican maJority m the Senate, understood the language to be
mmed at the lDlpenmssible "class legtslation" of the Black Codes. 133

127

Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (current versiOn at 42
u.s.c. §§ 1981-1982 (1991)).
128
See Bickel, supra note 7, at 22.
129
See BERGER, supra note 7, at 23.
130
See rd., see also Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenshlp Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV L. REv 1, 14 (1977).
131 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865). As it would finally appear
after several revisions, the proposed amendment read:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all pnvileges and
mununities of citizens m the several states
and to all persons m the
several States, equal protection m the nghts of life, liberty, and property.
BENJ. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
REcONSTRUCTION 61 (1914) (citations omitted).
132
See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legrslation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICHL. REv 245, 282-83 (1997).
133
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1866). Similar sentiments had
been expressed dunng the debate over the Civil Rights Act Representative James
Wilson, the Iowa Republican who sponsored the bill m the House, srud it would
mean only that "[o]ne class shall not be requrred to support alone the burdens
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Representative Hotchlass ofNew York, a moderate Republican who spoke
agamst Bingham's proposal, stated that its equal protection language was
designed to forbid a state to "discnmmate between its citizens and g~ve one
class of citizens greater nghts than it confers upon another." 134 While he
found tlus a laudable goal, Hotchkiss refused to support the proposal
, because it left protectionagamstunequalleg~slation to Congress's whim. 135
Better, he thought, to enact language that outlawed all such leg~slation by
proViding that ''no State shall discnmmate agamst any class of its
citizens."136 •
Hotchkiss's suggestion was not Ignored. In fact, when the equal
protection proposal reemerged from Committee, it had been changed from
a grant of authority to Congress to its present form-a limitation, though
an unspecified one, pnncipally on state leg~slative authority. 137 The
proponents ofthe reVISed equal protection language explamed that it dealt
a blow to eXIsting special class legislation m the states. Senator Jacob
Howard, a Michigan Republican, delivered the speech presenting the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate. 138 The speech deserves special
attention, as it represented theJomt Committee's official explanation ofits
proposal. 139 Senator Howard explamed:
[The Equal Protection Clause] abolishes all class legiSlation m the States
and does away with the mjustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a
code not applicable to another. It prohibits the hangmg of a black man for
a cnme for whtch the white man IS not to be hanged. It protects the black
man m hiS fundamental nghts as a citizen with the same shield wh1ch it
throws over the white man. Is it not time, Mr. President, that we extend
to the black man, I had almost called it the poor pnvilege of the equal
protection of the law? Ought not the time to be now passed when one

whtch should rest on all classes alike." /d. at 1117. Prestdent Andrew Johnson, who
vetoed the Civil Rights Act, nevertheless objected to the Black Codes on snnilar
grounds. In hts December 1865 State of the Umon address, President Johnson
declared that "there IS no room for favored classes or monopolies." 6 JAMES D.
R!CHARDSON,A COMPll..ATIONOFTiiEMESSAGESANDPAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS:
1789-1897, 361-62 (1901).
134
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
135
See ld.
136 /d.
137

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-67 (1866).
139
SeeJOSEPHB.JAMES, THEFRAMINGOFTHEFOURTEENTHAMENDMENT 137
(1956).
138
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measure of JUStice IS to be meted out to a member of one caste while
another and a different measure IS meted out to the member of another
caste, both castes bemg alike citizens of the United States, both bound to
obey the same laws, to sustam the burdens ofthe same Government, and
both equally responsible to JUStice and to God for the deeds done m the
body? 140

Other members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress expressed stm.ilar
sentiments m support of the equal protection proposal. Representative
James Wilson of Iowa, for example, stated that m a true republican
government there ts ''no class legtslation, no class pnvileges," and no laws
that legtslate "agamst [one class] for the purpose of advantaging the
mterestsof[another]."141 TotheframersoftheFourteenthAmendment, the
Black Codes epitomiZed such legislation; the Codes reduced the newly
freed slaves to a condition of mvoluntary servitude that undermined the
command of the Thirteenth Amendment. 142
Throughout the ratification process, Republicans consistently lauded
the protection affQrded by equal protection agamst tmpermtssible class
legtslation. 143 Senator Timothy Howe of Wisconsm smd that the Equal
Protection Clause was destgned to prevent the states from "deny[ing] to all
classes ofits citizens the protection ofequallaws"144 and to gtve the federal
government ''the power to protect classes agamst class legtslation." 145
Representative Thomas Eliot ofMassachusetts stated that the clause would
''prohibit State legtslation discnmmating agmnst classes of citizens."146
Representative Thaddeus Stevens ofPennsylvama satd that it would mean

°CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).

14

141

Id. at 174.
See 1d. at 1621-22, where Representative Myers suggested that the Black
Codes "impose by mdirection a servitude whlch the Constitution now forbids." Id.
Representative Thayer argued that the Black Codes were bemg used to "reduce
thiS class ofpepple to the condition of bondmen." Id. at 1151. Senator Wilson
stated that Black Codes "practically make the freedman a peon or a serf." Id. at
340.
143
See NELSON, supra note 7, at 115. Nelson observes that Republicans frequently stated that the "only effect'' of the Equal Protection Clause would be to
forbid the states from "discnmmat[ing] arbitrarily between different classes of
citizens" and to reqwre them to "treat[] [therr] citizens equally, distinguiShing
between them only when there was a basis m reason for domg so." Id.
144
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 219 (1866).
145
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 883 (1868).
146
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866).
142
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only that ''the same laws must and shall apply to every mortal, Amencan,
Inshman, Afncan, German or Turk." 147
Thus the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment were
concerned with class legtslation that lDlposed special burdens on one class
of citizens that were not to be shared by others, or granted special benefits
to one class not granted to another, prlDlarily because such special
legtslation "embodied discrlD1lnation and m this way helped to create
caste."148 As one commentator has observed: ''The Idea that laws should be
general and not tamted by considerations of class or caste was Widely
recogruzed and accepted before the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment was
enacted."149 As Justice Harlan, dissenting m Plessy v. Ferguson, 150
eloquently and succmctly stated the prmciple: "[l]n VIew of the Constitu. tion, m the eye ofthe law, there IS in this country no supenor, dommant,
ruling class of citizens. There IS no caste here.msr
IV EQUAL PROTECTION THEORY

The Supreme Court's theory of wrongful discnmmation under the
Equal Protection Clause has come a long way smce Justice Harlan's dissent
m Plessy. The anti-caste principle articulated by Justice Harlan was
embraced by Congress, and eventually by the Court, as it stepped m to
147

Thaddeus Stevens, The Pending Canvass!, Speech Delivered at Bedford, Pa.
(Sept. 4, 1866), zn THADDEUS STEVENS PAPERS 11 (Beverly Wilson Palmer ed.,
1993).
148
Sunstem, supra note 8, at 2436. One commentator has argued that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood the Equal Protection Clause to
nationalize a prohibition agamst "partial" or "special" laws, which smgled out
groups of persons for special benefits or burdens and had been developed m the
state.courts m the first half of the mneteenth century. See Melissa L. Saunders,
Equal Protection, Class Legzslation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH L. REv 245
(1997). Professor Saunders argues that while the framers of the Equal Protection
Clause did mtend to abolish all "caste" legiSlation, as Professor Sunstem and others
have argued, they used the term "class" legislation m a broader sense-"to refer to
any law that smgled out a certam class for special benefits or burdens, whether or
not it had a subordinating effect on a particular class." Id. at 290 n.198.
149
Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legzslation, and Sex Discnmznation: One Small Cheerfor Mr Herbert Spencer's Soczal Statics, 88 MICH. L.
REv 1366, 1376 (1990).
lso Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
lSI Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

~

94

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.89

adjudicate and nnplement the Fourteenth Amendment. 152 The Supreme
Court, however, founditselfill-eqmpped to enforce the anti-castepnnciple,
a task better left to Congress through the legislative function. To be sure,
the Court continues to be sensitive to the stigmatization ofprotected groups
by legiSlative act. That concern, agamst sigmatization, was at the heart of
the Fourteenth Amendment from the begmnmg, and some equal protection
theones focus exclusively on the plight of hlstoncally subJugated groups
or classes. Modem equal protection Jurisprudence, however, has become
more generally concerned with whether like classes are treated alike by the
government.
"Classes of one" who clann that local admlrustrators have engaged m
arbitrary or rrrational decisionmakmg do not mse core Issues of caste or
stigmatization. That IS not to say, however, that nothmg can be learned
from theones based on caste or stigma, or, for that matter, from the
framers' ongmal mtentions. This portion of the Article bnefly explores
some of the pnncipal theones of equal protection. Although the focus of
equal protection theones has varied, the unifymg pnnciple-borrowed
from the framers themselves-has remamed that governmental actions that
intentionally disadvantage certain groups, or certain mdiVIduals as
members ofa group, are forbidden under the Equal Protection Clause.
1

A. Theones ofStigma and Caste
There are four pnncipal theones of equal protection, three of which
will be discussed m Parts N .A and IV.B. Only one of the four theones-the so-called "anti-differentiation pnnciple"-bears directly on the
"class of one" scenano. This theory IS discussedm somewhat greater detail
mPartiV.C.
1. The Anti-Discnmmation Pnnczple-Stigma

The "stigma" theory153 ofequal protection can be traced to the Supreme
Court's opwon in Brown v. Board ofEducation and, before that declSlon,
to Justice Harlan's dissent mP/essy. It was perhaps best articulated by Paul

152

Perhaps the Court's best known anti-caste deciStons are Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which mvalidated segregation m education, and
Lovzng v. Virgzma, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which struck down state mtscegenation
laws.
153 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting the detnmental unpact of segregation).
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Brest/ 54 who used the phrase "anti-discnmmation pnnciple" to describe
''the general pnnciple disfavonng classifications and other decisions and
practices that depend on the race (or ethmc ongm) of the parties
affected." 155 The theory focuses on the unfair stigma caused by race-based
decisions that disadvantage members ofmmority groups. Brest focuses on
the harm caused by race-based classifications: "Decisions based on
assumptions ofintnns1cworth and selective mdifference mflictpsychological mJury by stigmatizing therr VIctims as mfenor." 156 This theory helps to
explam why rules that employ "suspect" predicates~ such as racial
predicates~ are umquely subJect to JUdicial mvalidation under the Equal
Protection Clause.
As Justice Black explamed m Korematsu v. United States~ 151 the case
m which the government attempted to Justify the mternment of JapaneseAmencans: "[A]lllegal restnctions which curtail the civil nghts of a smgle
raCial group are Immediately suspect. . [C]ourts must subJect them to the
most ng~d scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes JUstify the
eXIstence of such restnctions; racial antagorusm never can."158 Although
concerned pnmarily with racial stigmatizatio~ the anti-discnmmation
pnnciple IS broad enough to protect other group traits as well~ mcluding sex
and illegitimacy 159
While concerned with the harmful effects ofdiscnmmation based upon
membership m racial or ethmc groups~ the anti-discnmmation pnnciple IS
an mdiVIdualistic theory, concerned with the harm VIsited upon mdiVIdual
members of the smgled-out group. 160 The group itself, under this theory,
has no mtnns1c moral value or nght to compensation for harm VIsited upon
its members. As Brest explamed m his semmal article:
For adm1mstrative purposes, some remedies for racial discnnunation are
triggered by disproportionate rac1al Impact or treat persons according to
membership m rac1al groups; but group membership 1s always a proxy for
the mdivtdual's nght not to be discnmmated agmnst. Similarly, remedies
for race-specific harms recogmze the sociOlogical consequences ofgroup

4
IS PaulBrest,InDefonse oftheAntidiscnmmationPnnczp/e, 90 HARV.L.REv

1 (1976).
Iss Id. at 1.
Is6 Id. at 8.
Is?

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

Iss Id. at 216.
Is9 See Brest, supra
I60

Id. at 48.

note 154, at 5.
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tdentification and afftliation only to assure JUstice for mdivtdual
members. 161

In sum, the anti-discnmmation pnnc1ple reJects "[t]he notion that the
treatment of mdivtduals as a group for malign purposes requrres therr
treatment as a group for bemgn compensatory purposes." 162

.

2. The Group-Disadvantagmg Pnncwle-Caste
OwenFiss advanced what he calledthe "group-disadvantagmg"theory
of equal protection m his well-known article "Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause."163 Fiss's concern IS with practices that aggravate the
subordinate position of a "specially disadvantaged group,"
paradigmatically blacks. 164 In contrast to the anti-discnmmation prmc1ple,
Fiss's theory 1s explicitly group-onented. Fiss explams that one of the
reasons blacks fall withm the parameter of the Equal Protection Clause IS
because they are a "social group" 165-a social entity with a "distinct
eXIstence apart from its members" 166-that "has been m a position of
perpetual subordination," and whose "political power
IS severely
167
crrcumscribed." Fiss further explams that the Equal Protection Clause Is
not concerned with the effect of laws on particular mdivtduals. What IS
critical under the group-disadvantagmg theory IS that a law or practice
aggravates or perpetuates the subordinate position ofa specially disadvantaged group. Fiss writes: "[T]he Equal Protection Clause should be VIewed
as a prohibition agamst group-disadvantagmg practices, not unfarr
treatment . [A] claun of indiVIdual unfairness [should be] put to one
Id.
Id. at 51.
163
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.

t6t

162

AFF 107, 147 (1976).
164
See zd. at 147 For a more modem explication of the group-disadvantagmg
pnnctple, see Sunstem, supra note 8, at 2410. Simply put, Professor Sunstem's

"anticaste pnnctple" holds that "no group may be made mto second-class citizens."
Id. at 2429. See also Darnel Farber & Suzanna Sheny, The Panah Pnnczple, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996).
165
Fiss, supra note 163, at 154.
166
Id. at 148. Thts, along with what Fiss calls "interdependence"-hts notion
that "[t]he tdentity and well-bemg ofthe members of the group and the tdentity and

well-bemg of the group are linked"-are m hts vtew the necessazy and suffictent
conditions for the exiStence of a soctal group. !d.
167
Id. at 154-55.
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side.
" 168 Moreover, the theory applies only to "natural classes" or
groups. 169 Fiss explams that "the Equal Protection Clause. [does not
extend to] what might be considered artificial classes, those created by a
classification or critenon embodied m a state practice or statute.'mo
While Fiss 's theory, like other group-onented theones, assumes that it
IS permissible to have unequal distribution of welfare among mdiVIduals,
it holds that it IS unJust for one racial or ethruc group to be substantially
worse off than others. Thus, unlike the anti-discrimmation pnnciple, the
group-disadvantagmg principle IS essentially mdifferent to the history that
led to the unequal distribution. Fiss proposes a purely redistributive
pnnciple that requires relief for any group that constitutes a ''perpetual
underclass."171 Members ofthe group may partake ofthe remedy regardless
ofwhethertheywere m fact harmed by the state action; they are essentially
takmg as representatives of therr groups. Fiss's redistributive strategy
would, m his VIew, "g~ve expression to an ethical view agamst caste, one
that would make it undesirable for any social group to occupy a position of
subordination for any extended penod oftime."172

B. Process Theones
The oft-quoted footnote four m United States v. Carolene Products 113
IS the cornerstone of the ''process theory'' of equal protection. 174 As John
Hart Ely explams:
In a representative democracy value determmations are to be made by our
elected representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we can vote

them out of office. Malfunction occurs when the process tS undeservmg
of trust, when • though no one tS actually demed a votce or a vote,
representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically
disadvantagmg some mmority out of stmple hostility or a prejudiced
168

Id at 160.
Id. at 148.
170
Id at 156.
171
Id. at 150.
172
Id. at 151.
173
United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
174
See zd. at 152-53 n.4 (''Nor need we enqwre
whether prejudice agamst
discrete and msular mmorities may be a spectal condition, which tends senously
to curtail the operations of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect mmorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searchmg
JUdictal mquuy.").
169
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refusal to recogmze commonalities of interest, and thereby denymg that
mmority the protection afforded other groups by a representative
system. 175

A process theory lS concerned with the political role played by preJudices
and stereotypes about the moral mfenority of the targeted group. The
concern IS that these preJudices either prevent certam groups from
participating m the political processes or result m morally obJectionable
legtslative and executive actions or rules based on fundamentally false
premtses.
Under the process theory, the courts serve as a means of correcting
special lands of malfunctions m the political process, such as discnmtnatory treatment of so-called "suspect" classes. Ely mamtams that a suspect
class IS a "discrete and msular''176 mmority that IS ''barred from the
pluralist's bazaar, and thus keeps finding itself on the wrong end of the
legislature's classifications, for reasons that m some sense are discreditable."177 The process theory holds that only those groups unable to protect
themselves through the political process are entitled to heightened JUdicial
scrutiny of laws disadvantagmg them. They are "relegated to such a
position ofpolitical powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the maJoritanan political process.'ms Ely does not consider women
"discrete and msular," therefore, as they have extenstve, close contact with
men and constitute a maJority of the voting population. 179

C. The Anti-Differentiation Pnnczple
The concern with stigma, caste and process has gtven way m equal
protectionJunsprudence to a broader conception of''treating likes alike."
Twentieth century equal protection JUrisprudence has been dommated by
thiS "anti-differentiation pnnctple," which asks whether people who are
similarly situated have been treated similarly The "class of one" cases
Implicate thts theory of equal protection, as mdiVIduals complam that they
have been treated differently from all others who are "similarly situated."

175

JOHNHAR.TELY,DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 {1980).
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
177
ELY, supra note 175, at 152.
178
San Antomo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodnguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
179
ELY, supra note 175, at 164. Ely's theory has been criticiZed forbemg too
narrow m thts regard. See, e.g., Olga Popov, Towards a Theory of Underclass
Revzew, 43 STAN. L. REv 1095, 1097-98 (1991).
176
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This portion of the Article discusses the anti-differentiation pnnCiple
thoroughly, as it 1s the most relevant of the four pnmary theones of equal
protection.
In explicating the anti-differentiation pnnc1ple, the Supreme Court has
generally reqmred that discnmmatory state legislation must be based upon
"reasonable classifications."TheCourthas struggled, however, to precisely
define the parameters of penmssible government discnmmation. In its
modem equal protection Junsprudence, the Court has focused pnmarily
upon (1) the "rationality'' of the government's distinction, and (2) the
"purpose" of that distinction.

1. Mimmum Rationality
Since 1949, when Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek published
therr leading article on "The Equal Protection of the Laws," 180 the core
concept m equal protection theory has been the 1dea that equal protection
requires the equal treatment of"slmilar1y situated" persons. 181 As Tussman
and tenBroek explam:
The essence of
[the Equal Protection Clause] can be stated with
deceptive slDlplicity. The Constitution does not requrre that thmgs
different m fact be treated m law as though they were the same. But it
does requrre, m its concern for equality, that those who are SlDlilarly
situated be slDlilarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a
classification IS the degree of its success m treating slDlilarly those
slDlilarly situated. 182

The Supreme Court regularly articulates this "likes must be treated as
likes," or anti-differentiation, theory of equality m its equal protection
Junsprudence, 183 and other scholars have earned it forward and refined the
theory withm constitutional scho1arshlp. 184
180

Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection ofthe Laws, 37
CAL. L. REv 341 (1949).
181
Id. at 344.
182
Id. (footnote omitted).
183
See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Ltvmg Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439
(1985) ("The Equal Protection Clause
IS essentially a direction that all persons
slmilarly situated should be treated alike.'') (citing Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216
(1982)).
184

See, e.g., Kenneth W Simons, Ovenncluswn and Undenncluswn: A New
Model, 36 UCLAL. REv 448,456-60 (1989).
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It 1s a tru1sm that all laws classify. 185 Equal protection, according to the
anti-differentiation pnnciple, requrres that such classifications have a
certam relation to the purpose ofa particular law The rule Is usually stated
as reqwnng that a classification be rationally related to legitimate
government purposes. 186 As Tussman and tenBroek charactenze it, the
Equal Protection Clause embodies a pnnCiple of ''reasonable classification."187
The Supreme Court's earliest standard for legislative and admrmstrative classifications, as applied to government regulation of soc1oeconom1c
matters, reqwred s~mplythatthere be like treatment ofthose engagedm the
regulatedactivities. 188 This narrow VIew ofthe anti-differentiation pnnciple
was found to be unworkable, as entities withm the class who were treated
differently were by therr nature not "the same."189
The anti-differentiation principle, as developedm the Supreme Court's
equal protection Junsprudence, requrres that legislative enactments and
executive acts 190 meet the basic requrrement ofmtmmum rationality Equal
protection requrres "some rationality m the nature of the class smgled

185 See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 39 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("All
laws classify, and, unremarkably, the charactenstics that distingutsh the classes so
created have been JUdged relevant by the legislators responsible for the
enactment"); Personnel Adm'r ofMass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979)
("Most laws classify, and many affect certain groups unevenly, even though the
law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the class described
by the law."); see also Michael J. Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Apprazsal, 19 COLUM. L. REv 1023, 1068 (1979) ("Every
time an agency of government formulates a rult>-m particular, every time a
legiSlature enacts a law-it classifies.").
186 See, e.g., San Antomo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973)
("A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause
affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard ofrevtew, which
reqwres only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational relationship
to legitimate state purposes.").
187
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 180, at 344.
188
See Powell v. Pennsylvarua, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888) (holding that no
regulatoryprovtsion was repugnant to equal protection so long as it"place[d] under
the same restrictions, and subject[ed] to like penalties and burdens, all who
[were] embraced by its prohibitions.").
189
See TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1440.
190 It has long been established that the Equal Protection Clause extends to all
state action that demes equal protection, mcluding actions of the legtslative,
executive, and JUdicial branches. See Virgmta v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318
(1880).
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out,"191 with rationality tested by the classification's ability to serve the
purposes intended by the legiSlative or admmtstrative rule. In other words,
"[t]he courts must reach and deternune the question whether the classifications drawn m a statute are reasonable m light of its purpose."192
The government may determme that it IS m the public mterest to treat
the mentally ill differently from the mentally retarded, 193 Widowed spouses
who marry before age siXty differently than those who marry after siXty, 194
and plastic milk containers differently than paperboard contamers. 195 The
Equal Protection Clause requrres that the government JUstify its chmce of
which classes are subjected to regulation. The rntmmum rationality
standard IS extraordinarily deferential to the legislature's deternunation of
"fit" between the classes chosen and the governmental purpose. The
Supreme Court has generally upheld state classifications when applymg
rational basis reVIew to equal protection challenges. 196 Indeed, under
rational basis reVIew the Court has been willing to uphold classifications
so long as they are supported by any conceivable basis, whether that basis
has been articulated by the legislature or not. 197
2. lllicit Purpose
Although the fit between legislative means and ends has been the
dommant approach and has resulted, on rare occasions, m laws bemg
stncken for lack ofa rational basis, the Supreme Court has also mvalidated
legislative classifications based upon the illegitimate purpose behmd the
classification. This reVIew of governmental purpose has gamed currency

191

Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305,308-09 (1966).
McLaughlin v. Flonda, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
193
Hellerv. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,321-28 (1993).
194
Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 348-50 (1986).
195
Minnesota v. .Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,461-70 (1981).
196
See TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1443 (stating that the rationality requrrement lS
"largely equwalent to a strong presumption of constitutionality").
197
See zd., see also Kimel v. Flonda Bd. ofRegents, 120 S. Ct 631, 646 (2000)
("The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not requrre
States to match age distinctions and the legitimate mterests they serve with
razorlike prec1S1on."). The Supreme Court has been reluctant to strike down state
laws under rational basiS revtew. See Robert C. Farrell, Successfo/ Rational BaslS
Clazms zn the Supreme Court From the 1971 Term Through Romerv. Evans, 32
IND. L. REv. 357 (1999) (noting that durmg the past twenty-five years, the
Supreme Court has mvalidated laws under the rationality test on only ten occasiOns,
while reJecting such clatmS m one hundred cases).
192
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m approXImately the past three decades. 198 Indeed, m some mstances it
appears to have sharper teeth than the traditional means/ends reVlew. 199
The Supreme Court has mvalidated classifications because of
illegitimate purposes m two categones of cases. The first category consists
of classifications that favor m-state mterests to those of "outsiders." In
Zobel v. Williams,200 for example, the Supreme Court struck down as
rrrational an Alaska statute that distributed mcome from the state's natural
resources based upon the year m wluch residency was established.201 The
Court has held that such categonzations, wluch favor politically powerful
''permanent classes" of residents over out-of-state mterests, are motivated
by a bare desrre to mJure unrepresented outsiders. A motivation to benefit
m-state mterests or, conversely, to harm outsiders, IS not a constitutionally
rational basiS for classifymg groups. 202 Professor Sunstem has labeled ill
motives oftlus sort ''naked preferences."203
The second category of enactments mvalidated by the Court for lack
of a legitimate purpose are those m which a politically powerless or
margmalized group has been smgled out for unfarr treatment.204 These
''naked preferences" look very much like classifications based upon race
and gender, which courts have subJected to more exacting scrutiny,
although the Court has reframed from mvokmg its "suspect" or "quasisuspect" classificationJunsprudence to strike them down. The earliest case
was United States Department ofAgnculture v. Moreno, 205 m wluch the

198

See D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State Enforcement
ofMorality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv 67, 83-84 (stating that mquuy mto legitimacy of
legiSlative pwpose did not begm until the 1970s). For a discussion of the difficulty
ofascertammg leg15lative purpose, see generally William N. Eskndge, Jr. & Phillip
P. Fnckey, Legzslation Scholarshzp and Pedagogy zn the Post-Legal Process Era,
48 U. PITT. L.REv.. 691, 702-03 (1987).
199
See Darnel A. Crane, Faith, Reason, and Bare Anzmosity, 21 CAMPBELL L.
REv 125, 139-46 (1'999) (discussmg ''Bare Animosity Revxew").
200
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
201
Id. at 63.
202
See generally Hooperv Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985)
(invalidating New Mexico law that granted tax exemption to Vietnam Veterans
only if they had res1ded m state pnor to specified date); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (strikmg down Alabama tax on out-of-state
msurance comparues that was hxgher than tax levied agamst m-state entities).
203
See Cass R Sunstem, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REv 1689 (1984).
204
See Crane, supra note 199, at 139-46.
205
United States Dep't of Agnc. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the federal Food Stamp Act
of 1964 that was mtended to prevent "hippies" and "hippie communes"
from participating m the food stamp program. Justice Brennan, writing for
the maJority, stated: "[I]fthe constitutional conception of' equal protection
of the laws' means anythmg, it must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desrre to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental mterest."206
The Supreme Court reVIsited its ''naked animosity'' approach mPlyler
v. Doe,207 a case mvolvmg a Texas statute that prohibited children of illegal
1mm1grants from attending public schools. The Court determmed that the
State's purported JUstifications for the statute were mere subterfuge, and
that the purpose of the classification was to pumsh the children of illegal
1mm1grants for therr parents' status. It charactenzed the Texas law as an
effort to Impose "a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not
accountable for therr disabling status."208 The Court refused to recogmze
such naked antmosity as a legitimate governmental purpose, and msisted
that the State "do more than Justify its classification with a concise
expressiOn of an mtention to discrtmmate" agamst the children of illegal
Immigrants.209
The Supreme Court has granted similar protection under the Equal
Protection Clause to the mentally retarded. In City ofCleburne v. Cleburne
Lzvzng Center,210 the Court determmed that mrefusmgto grant a special use
permit for the operation ofa group home for the mentally retarded, the city
was motivated by ''negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cogmzable m a zonmgproceeding."211 Under the Equal
Protection Clause, the State must steer clear of its ''pnvate biases" and act
solely m the public mterest.212
Most recently, m Romer v. Evans,213 the Supreme Court mvalidated a
Colorado constitutional amendment passed by referendum which would
have prohibited the State of Colorado or any of its political subdiVIsions
from
adopt[ing] or enforc[ing] any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbtan or bisexual onentation, conduct, practices
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Id. at 534.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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Id. at 223.
209
Id. at 227 (citation omitted).
21
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne L1vmg Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
211
Id. at 448.
212
Id. (citing Palmore v Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
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Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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or relationships shall constitute or otherwiSe be the basts of or entitle any
person or class of persons to have or chum any mmority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claun of discnmmation.214
In Ins maJority opllllon striking down the Colorado constitutional amend-

ment, Justice Kennedy stated: "A law declanng that m general it shall be
more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek ru.d from
the government IS itself a demal of equal protection ofthe laws m the most
literal sense."215 Justice Kennedy mvoked the spirit ofthe Equal Protection
Clause, as well as the text ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, m strikmg down
the Colorado amendment. The Court determmed that the Colorado
amendment VIolated the naked ammositypnnciple because it "raiSe[d] the
inevitable inference that the disadvantage rmposed IS born of ammosity
toward the class of persons affected."216 In other words, the Colorado
amendment was born of a naked desrre to harm gays, lesbians, and
biSexuals.
In these "bare anrmosity'' cases, the Supreme Court mvalidated laws
not because the legiSlature did not formulate a tight "fit" between its means
and ends, but rather because the ends themselves were forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause. In a nation of equal laws, a naked desrre to harm
a· particular group of people IS a constitutionally illegitimate purpose.
Simply put, the State cannot smgle out a group of people for adverse
treatment solely because it does not like them, at least, the Court has
mdicated, when the group smgled out IS politically unpopular and lacks the
political wherewithal to defend itself from VIndictive lawmakers.
V. "CLASSES OF ONE" AND THE EQUAL PROTECfiON CLAUSE

Far from bemgpre-detemuned bypnorprecedent, Olech appears to be
at odds with a century of equal protectionJunsprudence. A "class of one"
IS no class at all, at least not as that term has been defined by the Supreme
Court. The Court'sJunsprudence reflects the history of the Equal Protection Clause, which Is bound up with notions of group treatment, and has
never been considered a tool for adjudicating claims of mdiviClual
miStreatment.217 Thus, contrary to Olech, there IS no doctrmal basiS for
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COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, znvalidated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
215
Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
216
217

Id. at 634.
See supra notes 152-216 and accompanymg text.
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treating an mdiVIdual white male as protected under the Equal Protection
Clause.
"'
A "class of one" consisting solely of a disappomted white male plamly
does not Implicate the anti-caste concern that animated the framers of the
Equal Protection Clause. Nor does such a "class" ruse concerns for
defending the politically powerless agamst negative stereotypmg or
differentiation by the government on some illegitimate basts, such as
sexual onentation or mental capacity, as m more recent Supreme Court
Junsprudence.218
The only possible theoretical underpmnmg for mvokmg the clause on
behalfofsuch a "class" IS the anti-differentiation pnnctple, which requrres
at a mmiiDum that the govemment state a rational reason for its linedrawmg or differentiating pnnctple-its "classification." As explamed
below, however, while the anti-differentiation theory holds out some
surface appeal m support ofthe "class of one" cases, upon closer exammation this theory also fails to proVIde an adequate foundation for applymg
the Equal Protection Clause to mdiVIduals who are disappomted by the
deciSions of therr local officials.
A. The Rights of "Persons" or Groups?
In the process of openm.g federal courthouse doors to mdiVIdual clmms
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Olech Court failed to consider even
baste pnnc1ples. To determme whether mdiVIdual clmms of mistreatment
are covered under the Equal Protection Clause, it IS necessary m the first
mstance to examme who or what IS the obJect of the protection afforded
under the Equal Protection Clause. Does the Equal Protection Clause
protect mdiVIdual persons, groups of indiVIduals, or both?
Perhaps the most common understanding of the purpose of the clause
IS that it protects blacks and other minority classes from racial or ethnic
stereotypmg or, worse, outnght racism. As Chief Judge Posner pomted out
m Indiana State Teachers Ass 'n, however, the Equal Protection Clause
"does not speak of classes," and, m Judge Posner's VIew, "[a] class,
moreover, can consist of a smgle member."219 As demonstrated m Part II,
the drafters of the Equal Protection Clause were burdened with far more
senous concerns at the time the clause was drafted than whether an
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See supra notes 163-216 and accompanymg text
Indiana State Teachers Ass 'n v. Indianapolis Bd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996).
219

106

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 89

mdiVldual could bnng a Vlable action under its language. They sunply
never considered the Issue.
Despite its statement m Olech that its cases ''have recogmzed" such
clmms, the Supreme Court has never been presented with the Issue of
whether mdiVldual clmms of mistreatment are properly the subject of the
Equal Protection Clause.220 The Court has, however, made the same
seemingly axiOmatic textual observation made by Chief Judge Posner m
Esmail-thatthe clause speaks m terms of "persons"-m City ofRichmond
v. J.A. Croson Co.;nt and, more recently, mAdarand Constructors, Inc. v.

Pena. 222
In Croson, the Court mvalidated a plan adopted by the Richmond City
Council that requrred. prune contractors to whom the city awarded
construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar
amount ofthe contract to one or more ''Minority Busmess Enterpnses." In
settling upon stnct scrutiny as the appropnate standard by which to JUdge
classifications drawn m favor of mmorities, the Court reJected the
argument that classifications that seek to benefit mmorities should be
subJected to lesser scrutiny than those that seek to disadvantage them. To
emphasiZe its commitment to color-blindness, the Court reiterated that
"'the nghts created by the first section ofthe Fourteenth Amendment are,
by its terms, guaranteed to the mdiVldual. The nghts established are
personal nghts.' ' 0223 In Adarand, the Court mvalidated federal highway

220

The Court cited only two cases that it clauned had "recogruzed" class of one
clauns under the Equal Protection Clause. One of the cases the Court relied upon,
AlleghenyPittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm 'n ofWebsterCounty, 488 U.S. 336
(1989), mvolved not an mdiv1dual claun of mistreatment but claims on behalf of
a group of property owners, who alleged that a tax assessor had assessed their
property differently from the property of those similarly situated based upon an
Improper charactenstic shared only by petitioners' properties. That IS not a "class
of one" scenano, but IS rather the sort of systematic line-drawmg with which the
Equal Protection Clause has always been concerned. The other case, Sioux City
Bndge Co. v. Dalinta County, Neb., 560 U.S. 441,446 (1923), IS a remnant of the
Court's earliest efforts to articulate a rationality standard. See supra notes 188-89
and accompanymg text. Sioux City was another dispute over tax assessments, m
which the Court treated all taxpayers as belongmg to asmgle "class," and found the
possibility ofdifferential treatment ofone class member-Sioux City-Implicated
pnnc1ples of equal protection. Sioux City, S60 U.S. at 446.
221
City ofRichmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
222
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200 (1995).
223
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948)).
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contract set-astdes for mmority busmess enterpnses. In the course of
rejecting the Idea of "bemgn" federal racial classifications, the Court
declared it a "baste pnnctple" that the Equal Protection Clause "protects
persons, not groups," and went on to Identify the nght to equal protection
as a "personal nght."224 If the object of the clause IS to protect "persons"
and ISm fact concerned only with ''personal nghts," perhaps the Equal
Protection Clause proVIdes an mdiVIdual, regardless of race, gender or
other group charactenstic, a federal constitutional remedy for unfarr
treatment at the hands of local officials.
As noted, m Olech the Supreme Court did not so much as mention the
text ofthe Equal Protection Clause. Nor, despite the fact that its statements
m Adarand and Croson appear on therr face to support the pnnctple that
class or group charactenstics are UTelevant under the Equal Protection
Clause, did the Olech Court rely upon those statements. Careful observation ofthe context m whlch the Supreme Court articufated this mdiVIdualistic approach to equal protection demonstrates why the Court did not even
citeAdarand and Croson. Those cases do not stand for the proposition that
the object of equal protection ts the mdiVIdual, wholly separate and apart
from any group to whlch he or she belongs. Indeed, when considered m
context, the Court's comments go m the opposite direction.
It IS critical to recogmze that m Croson and Adarand the Supreme
Court was addressmg the tssue of affirmative action, an Issue that presents
''the tension between the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
treatment of all citizens, and the use of race-based measures to ameliorate
the effects ofpast discnmmation on the opportunities enjoyed by mmority
groups m our society " 225 The pnnctpalissue before the Court m Croson,
and later m Adarand, was whether affirmative action policies were to be
subjected to the same "stnct scrutiny" as other race-based classifications.
In explammg its answer m the affirmative, the Court sa1d m Croson and
Adarandthat equal protectionnghts are personal msofar as the government
may not use race as the sole critenon m public declSlon-makmg, whether
distributing benefits or burdens, absent some very compelling reason (i.e.,
remedymgthe effects ofpast or current discnmmation226). After comment-
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Adarand, SIS U.S. at 227

225

Croson, 488 U.S. at 476-77
As the Supreme Court held m Croson, however, "an amorphous claun that
there has been past discnmmation m a particular mdustry cannot justify the use of
an unytelding ractal quota." Id. at 499. If the government IS to use race at all, it
226

must have evtdence that the scope of the remedy it proposes IS limited m some
reasonable sense to the IDJUry it wiShes to redress. See ld.
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mg that the Equal Protection Clause ''protects persons, not groups," the
Court explamed:
It follows from that pnnc1ple that all governmental action based on
race-a group classification long recogruzed as "in most crrcumstances
rrrelevant and therefore prohibited,''
should be subjected to detailed
judicial mquuy to ensure that the personal nght to equal protection of the
laws has not been mfrmged. These Ideas have long been central to this
Court's understanding ofequal protection, and holding "bemgn" state and
federal racial classifications to different standards does not square with
them.227

In other words, the government IS generally prohibited from usmg race or
other class-based charactenstics as a proxy. In the affirmative action

context, a white person has a ''personal nght" not to be pumshed because
ofms skm color for past discnmmation that IS umdentified, unproven, and,
therefore, unconnected to him. Thus, under Croson andAdarand, it is the
mdiVIdual's differential treatment based on hzs race that Implicates the
Equal Protection Clause.
The Import of the Supreme Court's mdiVIdualistic approach to equal
protection m affirmative action cases IS that even correctiveJUstice must be
color-blind. Non-VIctims should not benefit, and non-sinners should not
pay. Equal protection nghts are ''personal" only Insofar as the purpose. of
the clause IS to make the mdiVIdual, and not the group, whole. However,
what the clause reaches, and sometimes forbids, m the first Instance 1s
group-disadvantagmg governmental action. In other words, the clause IS
remedially personal msofar as remedies are fasmoned to fit mdiVIdual
cases, to reward VIctims and to pumsh wrongdoers, but underpmnmg this
mdiVIdualistic approach IS the notion that the government generally may
not disadvantage members of a class or group solely because they share
some common charactenstic. To borrow Professor Brest's succmct
explanation, the Supreme Court reJects the "notion that the treatment of
mdiVIduals as a group for malign purposes requrres therr treatment as a
group for bemgn compensatory purposes.•>228
B. There zs Not Always a "Class"

The language of the Equal Protection Clause settles nothmg with
regard to "class of one" cases. While it 1s the mdiVIdual ''person" who 1s
227

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (quoting Hirabayashl v United States, 320 U.S.
81, 100 (1943)).
228
See Brest, supra note 154, at 51.
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benefitted or harmed by government action m any particular case, the
Equal Protection Clause has always been concerned with group or class
distinctions.229 Whatever other conclusions one m.1ght draw from the
ratification debates, it 1s beyond dispute that the framers ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause were pnnc1pally concerned with
eradicating the caste discnmmation VIsited upon blacks m the post-Civil
War era.230 It IS also beyond debate that, whatever the mtentions of the
framers with regard to the scope of the Equal Protection Clause, the
Supreme Court long ago expanded the list of "suspect" or "quasisuspect" classifications to mclude those based upon gender and illegitimacy.231 All other classifications are subjected to so-called ''rational basts"
reVIew, which means either that the Court will analyze the degree of
"fit" between government means and ends,232 or, m a small but growmg
subset of cases, will mvalidate a law that the Court deems to have an
illegitimate purpose, 1.e., an mtent to disadvantage a politically powerless
group.233
In sum, Judictal mterpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 1s mextncably bound up with notions of group
charactenstics. It 1s the state's proxy, or broad generalization, that IS
subjected to scrutiny under the clause.
In this respect, the Equal Protection Clause IS quite different from other
proVIsions ofthe Bill ofRlghts. It IS clear, for example, that the protection
agamstunreasonable searches and seiZUres afforded to''persons" under the
FourthAmendment234 does not depend on group membership or status. The
same IS true of the nghts against double jeopardy and self-mcrlm.lnation
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See supra notes 152-228 and accompanymg text
See supra notes 122-51 and accompanymg text
231
See ERWINCHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONALLAW:PRINCIPLESANDPOLICffiS
§§ 9.4, 9.6 (1997).
232
See zd. at 541-45 (describmg the "reasonable relationship" requrrement of
the rational basiS test).
233 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Ltvmg Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(invalidating, under the rational basts test, a zonmg ordinance that prevented the
operation of a home for the mentally retarded).
234
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provtdes:
The nght ofthe people to be secure m therr persons, houses, papers, and
effects, agamst unreasonable searches and seiZUres, shall not be viOlated,
and no Warrants shall ISsue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affrrmation and particularly describmg the place to be searched, and the
persons or thmgs to be seiZed.
U.S. CONST. amend. N
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afforded the ''person" under the Fifth Amendment.235 The Equal Protection
Clause 1s different, however, because it addresses the unique wrong of
discnmmation.
Professor Sunstem explamed thls pomt m ms recent book.236 With
regard to the mdiVIdualistic text of the Equal Protection Clause ("any
person"), he states:
To be sure, "any person" may complam that a classification IS constitutionally unacceptable. But on what grounds can "any person" seek special
JUdicial assiStance? Under the equal protection clause, all claimS of
constitutional discnmmation are necessarily based on complamts about
treatment that smgles out a characteriStic shared by a group. • The ISsue
IS whether the government's use of that particular shared characterutic IS
disfavored from the constitutional pomt of VIew. There IS no senous
question about whether the charactenstics of which "any person" may
complam are shared characteriStics; of course they are. In this sense,
clam1s of unconstitutional discnmmation are always clam1s about the
government's ImpermiSsible use ofsome group-based characterutic, even
if those clatms are made by "any·person."237
In sum, the essence of the Equal Protection Clause 1s the prohibition of

group-based discnmmation.
Nearly all of the Supreme Court's equal protection Jurisprudence
addresses legislative classifications. The legislature draws classifications
based, hopefully, on some reasoned distinction rumed at servmg a lawful
purpose. By contrast, not all admmlstrative declSlons construct a we/they
line capable ofmeanmgfulJudictal reVIew. This 1s particularly true m the
"class of one" cases. In these cases the charge 1s that a government of:fic1al
has smgled out an mdiV1dual who does not belong to any group, vulnerable
or otherwise, for unfarr treatment. There has, quite simply, been no effort
235

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, m relevant

part:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwiSe Infamous
cnme, unless on presentment or mdictment of a Grand Jwy
nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put mJeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled m any cnmmal case to be a witness
agamst himSelf.
U.S. CONST. amend. V
236
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
237
Id. at 125-26.
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whatsoever to draw a line based upon some purportedly relevant distingUishing charactenstic. Consequently, there IS no "classification" as that
term. has been mterpretedandappliedm equal protectionJunsprudence and
scholarslnp.
Despite the absence of any effort to classify for the purpose of
enforcement of the law, Esmail and the other cases m winch courts
confrontedmdiVIdual clmms ofvmdictive action pnorto Olech determmed
that the absence of competing groups did not take the Equal Protection
Clause out ofplay.238 The First and Second Circuits did not state explicitly
why the absence of an Identifiable group charactenstic did not foreclose
reVIew under the Equal Protection Clause. At least m its most recent "class
of one" precedents, the Seventh Circuit ventured a two-pronged answer to
tlns doctnnal dilemma. Its textual answer was discussed m the preceding
section. The court's second pomtwas that "[a] class, moreover, can consist
of a smgle member."239 Indeed, according to Clnef Judge Posner: "There
IS always a class."240 In.Esmail, the Seventh Circuit held that the plamtiff' s
suit was not ''barred by the 'class of one' rule, because there IS no such
rule."241 In Olech, the Supreme Court accepted tlns pnnc1ple as well settled.
There are several problems with the notion that ''there ts always a
class" for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, or, stated differently,
that the alleged discnmmation creates the class. The first 1s a matter of
stmple definition. Classes and castes are group separators. IndiVIduals are
sorted mto one class or another based upon some charactenstic, like skm
color or gender, that they share with other members of the same group.242

238

See, e.g., Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995) (explammg
that an mdivtdual ought to have a remedy under the Equal Protection Clause).
239
Indiana State TeachersAss'n v. Indianapolis Bd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996).
240 /d.

>
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Esmail, 53 F.3d at 180.
242 See supra note 103 and accompanymg text; see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 248-49

(6th ed. 1990) (defimng "class" as "[a] group of persons,
thmgs, qualities, or activities, havmg common charactenstics or attributes," and
"classification" as an "[a]rrangement mto groups or categones on the bas1s of
established critena''). Similar class concepts antmate the definition of
"discnmmate." See supra note 102 and accompanymg text It may be argued that
my approach to "classes" requtres courts to draw difficult lines from time to time.
Are two people enough to mstitute a "class," or three? In most cases m which there
has been discnmmation based on group or shared charactenstics, the classification
will be clear. The pomt IS that equal protection prov1des a "personal" nght to be
free from mv1dious group or class discnnunation based on shared charactenstics
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Consistent with this definition of class, all of the equal protection
theones-anti-subjugation, group-disadvantagmg, process, and antidifferentiation-have as therr focus the treatment of one group VIs-a-VIs
another.243 The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence mediates
these group controversies generally by reVIewmg the legislature's
classifications under the "rational basis" reVIew for proper fit, and
occasiOnally for nnproper purpose, and uses "stnct scrutiny" only to
mvalidate those classifications based upon a "suspect'' charactenstic.244
Pnorto Olech, the Supreme Court had not squarely addressed whether
an mdiVIdual can constitute a "class" for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause. With few exceptions, the Supreme Court's equal protection cases
have mvolved either legislative line-drawmg that places different groups
on opposite sides of a chosen line, or executive action, such as cnmmal
prosecution, that targets a particular class or group.245 The Seventh Circuit
"class of one" cases nowhere mentioned any of the numerous Supreme
Court precedents that describe the Equal Protection Clause as a benchmark
for JUdgmg the validity of governmental groupmgs of mdiVIduals. In
Indiana State Teachers Ass 'n, the Seventh Circuit relied on Nixon v.
Admzmstrator of General Servzces,246 a case mvolvmg a legislative
enactment concermng the treatment to be afforded to former President
Nixon's presidential matenals, mcluding certain tape recordings that were
m danger ofbemg destroyed. The Supreme Court held that President Nixon
was a "legitimate class of one"247 such that Congress's enactment smgling
out his papers did not constitute an unconstitutional "bill of attamder."248
The Nixon case IS readily distinguishable on the ground that it did not

that are arbitrary or UTelevant
243
See, e.g., Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 180, at 344-53.
244
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 231, at 529-31. See also Kimel v. FlondaBd.
ofRegents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 645-47 (2000) (holding that age classifications do not
mvolve a htstoncally subJugated mmority, and are thus appropnately subJect only
to rational basiS review).
245
See znfra notes 283-309 and accompanymg text.
246
Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
247
Id. at 472.
248
U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3. Thts clause provides: "No Bill of Attainder or
ex post facto Law shall be passed." Id. A bill ofattainder IS "a law that legiSlatively
determmes guilt and mflicts pumshment upon an zdenti.fiab/e mdivzdua/ without
proVISIOn of the protections of a JUdicial tnal." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468 (emphasiS
added). President Nixon Initially challenged the act as violative of both the Equal
Protection Clause and the prohibition on bills ofattainder. However, he abandoned
the equal protection agreement before the Supreme Court Id. at 471 n.33.
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mvolve a claun ofunfarr treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, but
rather an allegation of an unconstitutional ''Bill of Attamder," which
smgles out an mdiVIdual or group for special pumshm.ent. Given that the
Court was not even discussmg the Equal Protection Clause and classifications challenged pursuant to that clause, Nixon IS thm support mdeed for
the statement that ''there 1s always a class" under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The other cases cited by the Seventh Circuit demonstrate the groupfocus ofthe clause. The court cited City ofNew Orleans v. Dukes,249 which
mvolved not a "class of one," but a murucipal ordinance that prohibited all
vendors from selling foodstuffs m LoUISiana's French Quarter unless they
had continuously operated therr busmess m that location for eight or more
years.250 The city, thus, drew a line separating the group oflong-standing
vendors from those who had operated therr busmesses for less than the
purportedly relevant time penod. Thus, Dukes set up a classic Equal
Protection Clause mqmryregardingthe legtslative "fit" between means and
ends.
In search ofsome support for its theory ofequal protection, the Seventh
Circuit stated m Esmail that City of Cleburne v. Cleburne bvzng Center,
Inc. 251 "implied" that an mdivtdual ought to have a remedy under the Equal
Protection Clause where he 1S subJected to vmdictive governmental
action.252 The Court's concern m City ofCleburne, however, was not with
unfair treatment VISited upon an mdiVIdual, but rather with a legtslative
classification that smgled out mentally retarded persons as a group and
placed them, based upon unwarranted stereotypes, under restrictions not
borne by members of the maJority group.253
Far from "implymg'' support for "class of one" equal protection
cases, pnor to Olech the Supreme Court had strongly suggested that it
would reJect the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that a "class" for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause can be "defined by reference to the discnmmation itself."254 In Personnel Admzmstrator of Massachusetts v.

249

City ofNew Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per cunam).
Id. at 298.
251
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Ltvmg Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
252 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995).
253
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (explammg that the ordinance shows "an
trrational preJudice agamst the mentally retarded" while noting that fraternity and
sorority members are not subject to the same treatment).
254
IndianaStateTeachersAss'nv.IndianapolisBd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 199.6).
250
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Feeney,255 the Court held that m order to state a chum under the Equal
Protection Clause, a plamtiffmust do more than demonstrate the disparate
unpact of a law; she must also demonstrate that the government official
acted with the mtent to discrunmate.256 Further, the "intent" requrred IS of
a particular nature when the Equal Protection Clause IS mvoked: the
decision-maker must have "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least m part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an zdentifiable group."251 Feeney came very close mdeed to
stating a "class of one" rule m equal protection cases. The bnef per cunam
opmton issued m Olech does not even mention Feeney.
Under the Supreme Court's anti-differentiation prmciple, as explamed
m Feeney, an equal protection claun must be based on mtentional
discrunmation agamst the plamtiffbecause of membership m a particular
class, not merely on allegations ofunfarr treatment of the mdiVIdual. The
Sixth Circuit's Futernzck deciSion IS not the only Circuit opinlon that
rejected an equal protection claun based on allegations that an mdividual
was treated unfarrly.258 As noted, pnor to Esmail, several of the Seventh
Circuit's own precedents rejected the notion that a "class" can consiSt of a
smgle person.259 Some of those opm1ons cited Feeney for the proposition
that allegations by an mdiVIdual that the person was treated unfarrly or
vmdictively do not suffice under the Equal Protection Clause. As the panel
explamed m New Burnham Prame Homes v. Village of Burnham: 260
''Discrimmation based merely onzndivzdual, rather than group, reasons will
not suffice."261
The Supreme Court has smd precisely the same thmg m its "selective
enforcement" or "selective prosecution" cases, which, agam, are nowhere
mentioned m 0/ech. "Selective enforcement" IS typically a defense rrused
to a crunmal prosecution, the argument bemg that the prosecutor has
smgled out the mdiVIdual for differential treatment-prosecution-while
cases agamst others slillilarly situated to the defendant have not been

255

Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding
Massachusetts law constdermg veterans for state ctvil servtce positions ahead of
non-veterans because purpose of the law was not to exclude women).
256 Id.
257

!d. at 279 (emphasts added).
See Futerruck v. Sumpter Townslup, 78 F.3d 1051 (6th Cir. 1996).
259
See supra note 25 and accompanymg cases.
260
New Burnham Prame Homes v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474 (7th
Cir. 1990).
261
Id. at 1481.
258
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pursued.262 In Oylerv. Boles,263 the Supreme Court reJected plamtiff' s chum
that he was selectively prosecuted under a repeat offender statute. The
Court stated:
[T]he conscious exerciSe ofsome selectivity m enforcement IS not m itself
a federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics m thts case

mtght unply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the
selection was deliberately based upon an unJustifiable standard such as
race, religzon, or other arbitrary classification. Therefore grounds
supporting a finding of a derual of equal protection were not alleged.264

Thus, m order to prove a claun of selective enforcement, a defendant must
demonstrate that the prosecutor decided to pursue hun because of his
membership m an Identifiable group, his holding of particular religious
bellefs, or some other arbitrazy "classification" based on an illegitimate
charactenstic.
In Wayte v. United States,265 the Court elaborated further on the
confines of the selective enforcement defense. In Wayte, petitioner was

mdicted for failure to register with the Selective Service System.266 He
moved to dismiss the mdictment, claiming that the Selective Service's
policy of investigating and refernng for prosecution only those who were
''vocal" opponents of the regiStration program VIolated the Fifth Amendment guarantee of equal protection.267 In response, ''the district court
dismiSsed the mdictment on the ground that the Government had failed to
rebut petitioner's pnma facie case of selective prosecution." 268 The Ninth
Circuit Court ofAppeals reversed.269 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that m order to prevail on a selective prosecution claun the defendant must
262

For a discuss10n of the defense of selective prosecution, see Karl S. Coplan,
Rethmlang Selective Enforcement zn the First Amendment Context, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 144 (1984).
263 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
264
!d. at 456 (emphasiS added) (citations omitted).
265 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
266 Id. at 603.
u,, Id. at 604. Although the Fifth Amendment does not contam an Equal Protection Clause, it does contam an equal protection component See Bolling v
Sharpe, 347U.S. 497,499 (1954) (explammgthat "the concepts ofequal protection
and due process, both stemmmg from our Amencan Ideal of farrness, are not
mutually exclusive").
268
Wayte, 410 U.S. at 604-05 (footnote omitted).
u,g Id. at 606.
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demonstrate that the prosecution was "deliberately based upon an
unJustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification
. mcluding the exerc1se of protected statutory and constitutional
nghts."270 Thus, m addition to demonstrating an Impermissible classification, defendant may also prevail on a selective prosecution claim if he can
show that lns prosecution v10lates ''protected statutory or constitutional
nghts," such as the exercise of First Amendment free speech nghts.
The Wayte Court found it "appropnate to JUdge selective prosecution
clalms according to ordinary equal protection standards."271 The Court cited
Feeney for the proposition that defendants must demonstrate that the
government official was motivated by an mtent to discnmmate based upon
an illegitimate group charactenstic.272 As the Supreme Court held more
than one hundred years ago m Yick Wo v. Hoplans, 273 a defendant may
demonstrate that the admmlstration of a cnmmal law Is "directed so
exclus1vely agamst a particular class ofpersons . with a mmd so unequal
and oppressive" that the system of prosecution amounts to "a practical
derual" of equal protection ofthe law.274 What was true when Yick Wo was
decided 1s no less true today· ordinary equal protection standards forb1d
illegitimate classifications, but they do not speak to mdiVldual chums of
unfarr treatment. At least, that was the understanding pnor to 0/ech.
Finally, as further demonstration that a class cannot be defined merely
by the discnmmation itself, the Supreme Court has grafted a class-based
animus requrrement onto certam federal c1vil nghts laws. The sUfVlvmg
vers10n of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, for example, prohibits
conspiracies "for the purpose ofdepnvmg, either directly or mdirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the 1aws.'ms The
Supreme Court has held that an actionable consp1racyundertlns proVIsion
must eVIdence "some raCial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, mVIdiously
discnmmatory animus behmd the conspirators' action."276 As the Court
explamed m Bray v. Alexandna Women's Health Clime,m it was only by
270

Id. at 608 (citations and mtemal quotations omitted).
Id.
272
ld. at 608-09.
273
Yick Wo v. Hopkms, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
274
Id. at 373 (emphasts added).
275
42 u.s.c. § 1985(3) (2000).
276
Griffin v. Breckenndge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (emphasts added) (holding
that"§ 1985(3) does not requrre state action but reaches pnvate consprractes •
that are auned at mvtdiously discnmmatory depnvations of the equal enJoyment
of nghts secured to all by law").
277
Bray v. Alexandna Women's Health Clime, 506 U.S. 263 (1992).
211
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limiting the c1vil nghts statute to race or other class-based amm.us that the
Court could av01d "interpreting [the Act] as a general federal tort law."278
While the scope of the "other'' class-based category remams unsettled, it
1s clear that actions under the statute allegmg a Vlolation of equal protection
must be based upon mVldious class ammus and cannot consist solely of
mdividual complamts ofunfarr treatment.279
Contrary to Olech, the notion of classes created with reference to
definmg group charactenstics has been a critical concept m equal
protection Junsprudence from the begmrung. The framers and ratifiers of
the Fourteenth Amendment sought to protect the class of newly freed
slaves from the Black Codes.280 The Supreme Court's Junsprudence
reaffirmed the framers' bedrock, and expanded the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause to cover any classification of citizens utilized by the
government to serve its ends. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
referees group conflicts-between men and women, nch and poor, and
long-standing residents and newly established busmesses-andadjusts the
level of scrutiny it applies based upon the group charactenstic the
government relies upon m makmg the classification. Until Olech, it was
farrly clear that the Equal Protection Clause could not be mvoked to
adjudicate mdiVldual claimS of unfarr treatment. As the Court stated m
Plyler v. Doe:281 "[t]he Equal Protection Clause was mtended to work
nothmg less than the abolition of all caste-based and mVldious class-based
legtslation."282 Thus, while all laws classify, it IS not accurate to state that
there IS always a class for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. There
are no castes of one.

C. Separation ofPowers and the L1mits ofJudic1al Revzew
There are three fundamental objections to permitting the federal courts
to referee mdiVldual clmms of mistreatment under standard equal
278

Id. at 268 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102). In Bray, the Supreme Court
held that§ 1985(3) does not provide a federal cause of action agamst persons
obstructing access to abortion climes. Id.
279 Justice Souter, for example, contends m hts opm10n m Bray that the other
"class-based" category of § 1985(3) IS not limited to race or like classes, but
extends as well to other legiSlative classifications subject to "rational bastS" review
under the Court's equal protection Junsprudence. See ld. at 295-96 (Souter, J.,
concumng m part and dissenting m part).
280
See discussiOn supra Part ill.
281
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
282
Id. at213.
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protection doctrine. First, "class of one" cases, or at least those shorn of
any requrrement that plamtiff demonstrate a campmgn of retaliation or
other mtent to mJure, proVIde no mediating prmc1ple for the decisionmaker to employ. Second, as the Sixth Circuit stated m Futemzck, "[t]he
sheer number of possible cases 1s discouragmg."283 Third, if there 1s to be
a referee m cases ofunfarr or arbitrary treatment at the hands of state and
local admmlstrators, that task ought to fall to the state courts, who should
Judge the dispute under prmc1ples of state law.
The Equal Protection Clause by itself proVIdes no workable test for
determmmg whether there has been a VIolation of one's equal protection
nghts. It has become the responsibility of the courts and commentators to
fashion some rule of dec1s1on to be applied when the clause 1s mvoked. We
rely on what Professor Piss long ago called "mediating prmc1ples"
-mediating because they '"stand between' the courts and the Constitution" and "give meanmg and content to an Ideal embodied m the text."284
However, as demonstrated, none of the mediating prmc1ples of the Equal
Protection Clause-caste, stigma, process, or anti-differentiation-apply
m the "class of one" cases.285
Despite its obVIous weaknesses, the "bad faith" or "malice" approach
adopted by the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits at least Imposed some
limits on the multitude of executive actions that could be challenged m
federal court under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, Justice Breyer's
concurrence m Olech noted that it was only the "added factor'' of ill will
that prevented the "class of one" cases from turnmg the courts mto zonmg
boards of appeai.286 In Olech, however, the Supreme Court put subJective
ill will to the side, opmmg that only arbitrary differential treatment need be
alleged to state a clmm.287
Olech leaves the courts with no mediating prmc1ple whatsoever. The
Seventh Circuit had defended its ''VIndictive action" theory on the ground
that the "loser'' m a zonmg contest could not "automatically appeal to the
federal courts on the ground that the decision was arbitrary "288 That result,
283

Futenuck v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1058 (6th Cir. 1996).
Fiss, supra note 163, at 107
285
See discussion supra Part IV
286
Village ofWillowbrookv. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1075 (2000) (percunam).
It IS doubtful, however, that even the "added factor'' of ammus would serve as
a significant or effective deterrent to lawsuits. If all it takes for a person who has
been demed a benefit to state a claun IS an allegation that a public official "had it
m for" him, we should expect such lawsuits to be more common.
287
See zd. at 1074.
288
IndianaStateTeachersAss'nv.IndianapolisBd. ofSch. Conun'rs, 101 F.3d
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996).
284
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Chief Judge Posner stated, ''would constitutionalize the Admnnstratlve
Procedure Act and make its proVISIOns bmding on state and local government and enforceable m the federal courts.,,289
However, that IS precisely the effect of Olech. There IS now no
executive or admmlstrative action that IS beyond the reach of the Equal
Protection Clause. After Olech, any mdiVldual who lS disappomted with a
local zonmg decision or, mdeed, the proVIsion of any mumcipal serVIce or
benefit, may appeal to the federal courts for redress. The courts must then
decide the equal protection clrum ''without any gwdance other than what
might be thought 1mplicit m the Idea of arbitrary governmental action. " 290
In addition to proVIding no mediating pnnciple of its own, Olech calls
mto question the mediating pnnciples the courts have relied upon to limit
equal protection clalm8. Employment discrlmination and selective
prosecution are JUst two examples. Under Feeney, a government employee
who cla1ms to have been wrongfully dism1ssed may mvoke the Equal
Protection Clause.291 Olech calls mto question employment decisions
289 Id~
290

Id. Remarkably, even after 0/ech, the Seventh Circuit continues to reqwre
that a "class of one" allege an unproper motive m order to state a clatm under the
Equal Protection Clause. See Hilton v City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir.
2000). In Hilton, the Seventh Circuit stated:
[W]e gloss "no rational basiS" m the unusual setting of"class of one" equal
protection cases to mean that to make out a pruna facte case the plamtiff
must present evtdence that the defendant deliberately soughtto depnve hun
ofthe equal protection ofthe laws for reasons of a personal nature unrelated
to the duties of the defendant's position.
Id. at 1008. Without such a requrrement, Chief Judge Posner argued, "the federal
courts would be drawn deep mto the local enforcement of petty state and local
laws." Id. See also Albtero v. City ofKankakee, 91 F Supp. 2d 1208, 1213 (N.D.
ill. 2000) (holding that to prevail on an equal protection claim, plamtiffmust prove
defendants "smgled hun out'' for differential treatment m a spiteful effort to "get"
hun); Singleton v. Chicago Sch. Reform BeL, No. OOC395, 2000 WL 777925, at
*10 (N.D. ill. June 13, 2000) (holding that a class of one plamtiff must allege
defendant's actions ''were motivated by vmdictiveness and spite''); Kevm v.
Thompson, No. 99 C 7882, 2000 WL 549440, at *6 (N.D. lll. May 1, 2000)
(dismtssmg class ofone complamt where there was no allegation that declSlon was
''vmdictive, motivated by any illegitimate animus or caused by subjective ill will").
291
See Personnel Adm'rv. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,273 (1978) (explammg that
"[a]lthough public employment ts not a constitutional nght
any state law
overtly or covertly destgned to prefer males over females m public employment
would requrre an exceedingly persuastve Justification to withstand a constitutional
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause").
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allegedly based upon gender, race, or some other group charactenstic.292
Feeney requrres that plamtiffs m such cases prove mtentional discnmmation based upon some group charactenstic. However, after 0/ech, all that
IS requrred IS an allegation that plamtiff was dismissed while others
allegedly "stmilarly situated" were not. In other words, plamtiffs need not
allege, or prove, mVIdious discnmmation based on shared charactenstics,
but only that they were dismissed, I.e., "discnmmated" agamst, for no
rational reason.
LikeWise, the Supreme Court's selective prosecution precedents, wlnch
mvoke standard equal protection doctnne, requrre an allegation of
mistreatment based upon an illegitimate classification, such as religion,
race, or pumshment for exercise of a constitutional nght.293 If, as Olech
suggests, standard equal protection doctnne extends to every allegedly
arbitrary decision made by a government official, an mdiVIdual may
challenge the deciSion to prosecute without reference to any Improper
classification. Under Olech, there would appear to be no limits to the reach
ofthe Equal Protection Clause.294 In Professor Piss's words, "class of one"
cases offer nothmg to "'stand between' the courts and the Constitution"
and ''to give meanmg and content to an Ideal embodied m the texi."295
To be sure, an mdiVIdual who challenges government action as
arbitrary under the deferential "rational basis" test will be unlikely to

292

See, e.g., Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, ll51 (7th Cir. 1990} (holding
that plamtiff that alleged she was dismissed because of her gender m violation of
the Equal Protection Clause "must show mtent to discrunmate because of her status as a female and not because of charactenstics of her gender which are personal
to her''}.
293
See supra note 29 and accompanymg text
294
The Fifth Circuit has exammed a selective prosecution clrum post-0/ech. In
Bryan v. City ofMadison, 213 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2000}, the court held that "to
successfully bnng a selective prosecution or enforcement clrum, a plamtiff must
prove that the government official's acts were motivated by tmproper
considerations, such as race, religion, or the desrre to prevent the exercise of a
constitutional nght" Id. at277 (footnote omitted}. The Fifth Circuit further opmed
that the Supreme Court's opwon m 0/ech did not alter the requrrement that "class
of one" selective prosecution plamtiffs "must assert membership m a larger
protected class." Id. at 277 n.17 That mterpretation, however, lS contrary to the
plam holding of the 0/ech opwon, which, like the Seventh Circuit's ''vmdictive
action" precedents, recogmzes an mdiv1dual's nght to equal protection regardless
of any group membership or Identification. See Village ofWillowbrook v. Olech,
120 S. Ct 1073 (2000} (per cunam}.
295
Fiss, supra note 163, at 107
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succeed. At least that IS true where the decision maker can proffer some
legitimate reason for the action taken.296 However, the fact that a defense
may be available m most cases does not excuse the expansion of a
constitutional proVIsion to cover every conceivable case. The Supreme
Court has stated that the Constitution and its amendments were mtended to
apply to ''the large concerns of the governors and the govemed.''297 That
mtent has been earned out m equal protectionJunsprudence by focusmg on
classifications that have effects beyond the confines of disputes over
mdivtdual benefits. SubJecting a plamtiff to an eighteen foot easement
differential or failing to timely connect a homeowner's sewage line or pick
up 1us trash, though actions that are undoubtedly of concern to the
mdivtduals involved, are hardly the type of "large concerns" that should
embroil the federal courts m constitutional questions. Such disputes will
transform the federal courts mto overseers of the day-to-day conduct of
local government officials. Further, the Supreme Court has been highly
sensitive to the prospect of subJecting government officials to mtrusive and
time-consummg lawsuits. In Crawford-El v. Britton,298 for example, the
Supreme Court stated that ''there IS a strong public mterest m protecting
public officials from the costs associated with the defense of damages
actions."299
In Esmail, Chief Judge Posner argued that claims of mistreatment by
state and local officials called for a federal remedy In closmg his opmion,
he noted that: "[a] class of one IS likely to be the most vulnerable of all."300
Consider a person, regardless of color, who has the weight of the government brought upon htm for no reason other than sheer hatred. As Chief
Judge Posner further commented m Esmail: ''If the power of government
IS brought to bear on a harmless mdivtdual merely because a powerful state
or local official harbors a malignant antmosity toward htm, the mdivtdual
ought to have a remedy m federal court."301
Olech does not rest upon orchestrated campatgns of vengeance,
malignant antmosity, or even the naked abuse of government power.302
296

See, e.g., Wroblewskt v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 459 (7th Cir.
1992) (stating that "[t]he rational basts standard requrres the government to wm if
any set of facts reasonably may be conceived to JUStify its classification").
297
Damels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
298
Cra.wford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
299
Id. at 590.
300 Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995).
301
Id. at 179.
302
See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct 1073, 1075 (2000) (per
cunam).
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Rather, the deciSion extends to even the most routine of government
decisions such as the demal of some benefit to wlnch plamtiffbelieves she
IS entitled. It sets up the federal courts not Just as zomng boards of appeals,
but rather as arbiters of every wrong allegedly committed by a local
admlmstrator. Every appeal m the zomng context, for example, necessarily
mvolves some allegation that the board exceeded, abused, or distorted its
legal authority. The breadth of the equal protection doctnne the Supreme
Court accepted as settled m Olech IS disconcerting.303
A weak or ambiguous mediating prmciple will mvite lawsuits. The
Sixth Circuit is not the only court concerned about the "sheer number of
possible cases"304 likely to be spawned by the "class of one" precedents.
The Seventh Circuit voiced its own concerns m Olech, stating that "[o]f
course [they were] troubled, as was the distnct JUdge, by the prospect of
tummg every squabble over mumcipal services, of wlnch there must be
tens or even hundreds ofthousands every year, mto a federal constitutional
case."305 It IS not hyperbole to suggest that tlns will be precisely the effect
of Olech. A plamtiff need only artfully plead m the complamt that an
official acted arbitrarily or rrrationally m order to cause that official to
appear and defend agamst the allegations.
Perhaps even more troubling than the burdens posed by the "class of
one" cases IS the federalization ofthese local disputes between citizens and

303 It was entirely unnecessary m Olech to create a broad new remedy m federal

court for every local wrong. Esmail and other classes of one already have federal
constitutional remedies at therr disposal. First, under the Wayte dects1on, ifEsmail
had alleged that the government official sought to "get'' htm because ofhis exercise
of First Amendment nghts (a clatm Esmail did not, but could have, made), he
would have stated a valid selective enforcement clatm. See Esmail, 53 F.3d at 178.
Thus, at least where the plamtiff is exerciSmg a constitutional nght at the time of
thevmdictive action, he may mvoke the selective enforcement precedents. Further,
the Due Process Clause ts the provision that polices fatmess between the state and
the mdivzdual dealing with the state, regardless of how other mdividuals m the
same situation may be treated. See supra Part VI. The approach developed m those
cases limits actionable executive action to egregious or outrageous behavtor, and
I argue that "class of one" equal protection clatms, if they are to be permitted,
ought to be similarly limited.
304 Futerruck v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1058 (6th Cir. 1996).
305
Olech v. Village ofWillowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998), ajf'd
per cunam, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000). See also Hilton v. City ofWheeling, 209 F.3d
1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (warnmg that without a mediating pnnciple, ''the
federal courts would be drawn deep mto the local enforcement of petty state and
local laws").
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therr government officials. On this pomt the words of the Seventh Circuit
m Indiana State Teachers Ass 'n bear repeating:
The concept of equal protection IS trlVlalized when it IS used to subJect
every deciSion made by state or local government to constitutional review
by federal courts. To decide IS to choose, and ordinarily to choose
between-to choose one suppliant, applicant, petitioner, protester,
contractor, or employee over another. Can the loser m the contest
automatically appeal to the federal courts on the ground that the deciSion
was arbitrary and an arbitrary deciSion treats likes as unlike and therefore
derues the equal protection of the laws? That would constitutionalize the
AdmmiStrative Procedure Act and make its provisions bmding on state
and local government and enforceable m the federal courts.
The
review of such a deciSion not clazmed to violate some other source of
constitutional obligation such as the free speech clause of the. First
Amendment IS not the proper busmess of the federal JUdiciary, wluch
would be operating without any guidance other than what might be
thought unplicit m the Idea of arbitrary governmental action.306

It would be difficult to better articulate the pnmary obJections to makmg
the "class of one" cases the provmce of the federal JUdiciary
The federal courts are not the proper fora m winch to litigate purely
local disputes. That IS particularly so when the pnncipal question posed IS
whether the regulator has acted arbitrarily. There are state laws and
procedures upon which to base such a clrum. Arbitrary government action
Is prohibited and subject to mJunction under the common law, and most
states have admimstrative procedure acts oftherr own.307 Thus, there IS no
compelling reason for the federal JUdiciary to msert itself into the day-today conduct of local government officials. As the Futemwk court
explamed:
Those affected by the unfiur regulator have recourse to the state political
processes that appomted that regulator m the frrstplace. State courts or the
state constitution may provide protection. • Absent a breakdown m the
state's normal political process that unfrurly affects a protected group or

306

Indiana StateTeachersAss'nv.IndianapolisBd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101 F.3d
1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996).
307
See, e.g., Arnold v. Engelbrecht, 518 N.E.2d 237,239 (Ill. 1987) (holding
that discretionary acts of public official which are arbitrary and capnc10us are
subject to mJunctive relief).
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the exercise of constitutional nghts, we can and should trust states to
police adequately therr own processes.308

In.Esmail, the Seventh Circuit asserted, without citation to any authority or
example, that "[a]lthough the courts oflllinms seem to have been perfectly
ready, willing, andabletoprotectEsmail agamstMayor Macrane, powerful
state or local officials are not infrequently able to overawe state or local
courts."309 To accept that assertion as constitutional doctnne lS to make
every matter of state politics the domam of the federal JUdiciary Th.ts
underestimates anddemgrates the state andlocaljudicianes, who ought not
be pushed aside m order that federal constitutional doctnne may be
unnecessarily expanded.
It IS rromc that the Supreme Court, which of late has emphasiZed
principles of federalism and has limited access to federal courts, would
mvite countless clmms allegmg that the federal constitution has been
VIolated by local and state government officials.310 In light of its mterpretation ofthe Due Process Clause, as discussed in the final Part ofthis Article,
it IS surpnsmg that the Court did so.
VI.

EXPOUNDING A CONSTITUTION-8UBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Under the Equal Protection Clause, mdiVIdual clmms of mistreatment
should be put to one side; yet, if they are to be permitted under Olech, the
courts will need a mediatingpnnctple to apply, lest the federal constitution
swallow whole state processes for adjudicating allegations ofexecutive and
adtmmstrative misconduct. A constitutional standard already eXIsts to test
indiVIdual clmms ofarbitraryexecutiveaction. That standard has its ongms
m the area of substantive due process, and it permits relief from allegedly
arbitrary government action only m the rarest of crrcumstances. In that
308

Futemzck, 78 F.3d at 1059.

309

Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995).

310

See, e.g., Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bel,

527 U.S. 666, 680-81 (1999) (reJecting unplied waiver as a basiS for abrogating
states' sovereign Immunity and·holding that any waiver of sovereign Immunity by
a state must be express); Alden v. Mmne, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (holding that
"our federalism" requrres that Congress treat states m a manner mdicative oftherr
status as residuary sovereigns); Semmole Tribe ofFla. v. Flonda, 517 U.S. 44, 72
(1996) (stating that"[e]ven when the Constitution vests m Congress complete lawmakmg aiithority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
Congressional authonzation of suits by pnvate parties against unconsenting
states").
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respect, it stands m stark contrast to the "class ~f one" approach under
Olech.
A. ' Substantive Due Process-The Consczence-Shockmg Standard

For more than a century, the Supreme Court has mterpreted the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,311 not the Equal Protection
Clause, as the constitutional guarantee "intended to secure the zndivzdual
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."312 Recently, the
Court explamed m County of Sacramento v. Lewzs3 13 that "[w]e have
emphasiZed time and agam that '[t]he touchstone of due process IS
protection of the mdiVIdual agamst arbitrary action of government.' "314
Indeed, the core concept of due process IS protection of the mdiVIdual
agamst arbitrary action. Tins IS true whether the challenge IS to the demal
of fundamental procedural farmess or, as the Lewzs Court stated, "in the
exercise of power without any reasonable JUstification m the semce of a
legitimate governmental obJective."315 It IS with the lattercrrcumstancethat
the so-called "substantive due process" doctrine IS concerned. InLewzs, the
Supreme Court held that a police officer's actions durmg a high-speed
chase did not VIolate the substantive component ofthe Due Process Clause
because the officer's conduct did not "shock the conscience."316 In an
attempt to giVe content to the "shocks the conscience" standard, the Court
stated that "conduct mtended to mjure m some way unJustifiable by any

311

The Due Process Clause provxdes m part: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abndge the pnvileges or nnmunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State depnve any person or life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. "U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
312
Hurtado v. Califorrua, 110 U.S. 516,527 (1884) (emphasxs added). In Ross
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), then Justice Rehnquxst distinguished the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses by explammg that "'Due process' emphasxzes
fauness between the State and the mdivzdual dealing with the State, regardless of
how other mdivxduals m the same situation may be treated. 'Equal protection,' on
the other hand, emphastzes disparity m treatment by a State between classes of
mdivzduals whose situations are arguably mdistinguxshable." Id at 609 (emphasxs
added).
313
County of Sacramento v. Lewxs, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
314
Id. at845 (quotingWolffv.McDonnell,418U.S. 539,558 (1914)).Seealso
Danxels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (''The touchstone of due process xs
protection of the mdivxdual agamst arbitrary action of government").
315
Lewzs, 523 U.S. at 846.
316 Id. at 833.
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government mterest IS the sort of official action most likely to nse to the
conscience-shockmg level."317
Due process m its substantive sense limits what the government may
do both m its legislative and executive capacities. However, m Lewzs the
Supreme Court held that the "critena to Identify what IS fatally arbitrary
differ depending on whether it IS legislation or a specific act of a governmental officer that IS at Issue."318 In cases mvolvmg challenges to
legislation, courts must mqurre whether the clrumed due process mterest IS
a :fundamental nght "deeply rooted m this Nation's history and tradition .
and Implicit m the concept of ordered liberty " 319 It 1s only executive
actions that are subJect to the '"shocks the conscience" standard.320
The Supreme Court's substantive due process cases mvolvmg
executive action emphasiZe that "only the most egregious official conduct
can be said to be 'arbitrary m the constitutional sense.' " 321 The Supreme
Court has explamed that only by so limiting the range of potential liability
can the Court recogniZe that-as noted by Chief Justice Marshall early m
the development ofjudic1al reVIew-"it IS a constitution we are expoundmg."322 In Lems, the Court bnefly explamed its basis for cabmmg
executive liability under the federal constitution: "[E]xecutive action
challenges ruse a particular need to preserve the constitutional proportions
of constitutional clrums, lest the Constitution be demoted to what we have
called a font of tort law."323

B. A "Font" ofAdmmzstrative Law
The "class of one" cases324 Implicate precisely the same concerns.
IndiVIdual clrums of executive or admimstrative misconduct under the
Equal Protection Clause threaten to "demote" the constitution to a "font"

317

Id. at 849 (citation omitted). The "shocks the conscience" standard
ongmated mRochm v. Califomra, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where the Court held that
the forced pumpmg ofa suspect's stomach "shocked the conscience." !d. at 172-73.
See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (reiterating that such
conduct "shocked the conscience" and was so "brutal" and "offens1ve" that it did
not comport with "traditional Ideas of farr play and decency").
318
Lewrs, 523 U.S. at 846.
319 Washmgton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
320
Lewrs, 523 U.S. at 846.
321
Id. (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
322
M'Culloch v Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
323
Lewrs, 523 U.S. at 847-48 n.8.
324
See discussion supra Part IV
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not of tort, but of admnu.strative law. There IS no pnncipled reason to allow
such claims to be brought readily m federal court under the Equal
Protection Clause, while limiting the same actions brought under the Due
Process Clause to conduct that "shocks the conscience" ons "egreg~ous."325
Allowmg clauns of rrrational or arbitrary executive and admnu.strative
action to be brought m federal court by classes of one under traditional
equal protection doctrine will supplant state admnu.strative law and, as the
Seventh Circuit itself pomted out m the "vmdictive action" cases,
constitutionalize the federal Adnnmstrative Procedure Act.326
IndiVIdual challenges to the decisions of state and local executive
officials are plamly the provmce of the Due Process Clause. However, if
the Court IS to mterpret the Equal Protection Clause as reaching these
clcums, it ought to at least subJect them to the same "shocks the conscience" standard as it does clauns of executive rmsconduct under the due
process guarantee. Like the Due Process Clause, equal protection "does not
entail a body of constitutional law 1mposmg liability whenever someone
cloaked with state authority causes harm."327 Only by treating "class of
one" clauns m the same manner as those mvokmg the substantive due
process guarantee can the courts limit these cases to the most egregious and

325

To be sure, the Supreme Court has been wary of expanding liability based
upon the "textual conundrum of substantive due process." John Hamson,
Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV 493, 502
(1997). Thus far, the Court has applied the standard only m cases mvolvmg
phys1cal mJury to the plamtiff. But it IS not necessarily so limited. See Rosalie
Berger Levmson, Protection Agamst Government Abuse ofPower- Has the Court
Taken the Substance Out ofSubstantiveDueProcess?, 16 U.DAYTONL.REv 313
(1991) (argumg that conduct short of phys1cal abuse may satisfy the "shocks the
consc1ence" standard). See Washmgton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)
(explammg that "we 'ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of
substantive due process because gu1deposts for responsible deciSlonmakmg m this
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended'") (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
But expanding the constitutional proportions of executive and admmlStrative
liability under the Equal Protection Clause merely because it IS a more favored
clause IS not a prmc1pled distinction. Such an expansion creates the same difficulty
the Court has assiduously tned to avotd m its due process cases, and the Equal
Protection Clause 1s also charactenzed by "scarce and open-ended" critena. State
law ought not be supplanted by federal constitutional doctnne, whether the state
law at ISsue sounds m tort or admmistrative law.
326
See Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v. Indianapolis Bd. ofSch. Comm'rs, 101
F.3d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1996).
327
Lewzs, 523 U.S. at 848.
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arbitrary conduct, thereby preservmg the proper constitutional proportions.328

As the Second Circuit stated m a case mvolvmg a substantive due
process challenge to a zonmg decision sunilar to that m Olech:
Substantive due process IS an outer limit on the legitimacy ofgovernmental action. It does not forbid governmental actions that mtght farrly be
deemed arbitraty or capncious and for that reason correctable m a state
court lawsuit seelang revzew of admmzstrative action. Substantive due
process standards are violated only by conduct that IS so outrageously
arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority.329

What the substantive due process guarantee reaches, and what the Equal
Protection Clause ought to be limited to in class of one cases, are government officials who abuse therr power, or "employ[ ] it as an mstrument of
oppression."330 That standardnghtly ''pomts clearly away from liability, or
clearly toward it, only at the ends ofthe [admmlstrative] law's spectrum of
328 From a textual standpomt, there IS no reason the courts could not borrow the

"shocks the conscience" standard m equal protection cases challengmg arbitrary
executive action. The text ofthe Due Process Clause nowhere requrres that conduct
"shock the conscience" to be actionable. Nor does the Equal Protection Clause on
its face distinguiSh among "rational," "important," and "compelling" government
mterests. These are court-fashioned standards used to limit the reach of broadly
worded constitutional provisions. It should make no difference of constitutional
proportions whether a plamtiff challengmg executive action couches hiS clium m
terms of equal protection· or due process, or whether these clrums create a "font"
of tort or adminiStrative law.
329
Natalev. Town ofRidgefield, 170 F.3d 258,263 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasiS
added). See also G.M. Eng'rs &Assoc. v. W. Bloomfield Township, 922 F:2d 328,
332 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that local zonmg actions viOlate substantive due
process only if they "shock the conscience"); Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of
Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that "substantive due
process clrums should be limited to 'truly rrrational' governmental actions [such as]
attempting to apply a zonmg ordinance only to persons whose names begm with
a letter m the first half of the alphabet").
330 Davtdson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986). InRabznovitz v. Rogato, 60
F.3d 906 (1st Cir. 1995), the court cautioned that "routine" clrums that a zonmg
official acted maliciously "are likely to have rough sailing." Id. at 912. However,
the court allowed the case to proceed because, based on the evidence, "a reasonable
Jury might well be able to conclude that there was an orchestrated consprra.cy
mvolvmg a number of officials, selective enforcement, malice, and substantial
harm." Id.
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culpability " 331 In that sense, the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits' focus
on ''vmdictiveness"-a concerted effort to "get" an mdiVIdual or an mtent
to mJure hun-correctly, ifsomewhat unperfectly, limits the constitutional
proportions of these equal protection clauns.332 There must, however, be
substantially more than a smgle act of malice underlymg some routine
admmtstrative action.

C. The "Bare Anzmus" Cases
Efforts to "get" an mdiVIdual through "orchestrated campru.gn[s] of
vengeance"333 are the sort of "conduct mtended to mJure m some way
unJustifiable by any government mterest" that 1s the target of the
consc1ence-shockmg standard.334 It IS m such cases that federal remedies
are most appropriate, as the machinery of state or local government has
platnlymalfunctioned. All other cases, mcludingroutinezonmg challenges,
or allegations of a smgle act of ill will or anunus, ought to be left to the
state courts. Although the Court did not fully explam the
legislative/executive distinction m Lew~s, it seems clear that there 1s a
mediating prmc1ple at work. Legislation represents the mstitutional
JUdgment of the members of an elected branch of government, while
executive action tends mru.nly to consist of conduct undertaken by a smgle
actor. Thus, it 1s reasonable to unpose a different standard on challenges to
executive action than applied to legislative challenges. What the Court 1s
concerned with under the Due Process Clause 1s the systematic breakdown
ofthe governmental function, not random carelessness orrmstakes.335 Thus,

331

Lewzs, 523 U.S. at 848. It lS unportant to remember, when delineating the
bounds oftherr liability, that local and state admuustrators are called on to make
many routine diVISions each day. As ChlefJudge Posner noted m 0/ech, there may
be "tens or even hundreds of thousands" of disputed diVISions each year." Olech
v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998).
332
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit failed to limit its "no vmdictive aetion"
precedents to Instances m whlch there has been a systematic malfunction m the
admm1stration of local laws, such as an "orchestrated campmgn of offictal
harassment" Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995).
333
/d. at 178.
334 Lewzs, 523 U.S. at 849.
335
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confoszons About Due Process, Judiczal
Revzew, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L.REv. 309,327 (1993) (argumg
that due process law ru.ms to "ensure that governmentallawbreakmg does not reach
ambition lS more clearly unplicated m
mtolerable levels" and that "thls •
challenges to rules and legiSlation than m mdivtdual tort actions'').
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it IS not the Isolated act of denymg an mdiVIdual a permit, even if that
demalis based on ill will, that deserves constitutional rebuke, but rather the
concerted effort or pattern of seekmg vengeance or retaliation agamst the
mdiVIdual.336 Carrymg tlus distinction over to the "class of one" equal
protection cases, it may be appropnate to apply traditional notions of equal
protection to legzslation that smgles out an mdiVIdual or entity for special
treatment, as tlus would constitute, by definition, a systematic depnvation
ofequal protection. However, traditional notions ofequal protection would
not apply to run-of-the-mill executive actions, but only to those, like an
orchestratedcampmgn to pumshan mdiVIdual, that "shock the conscience."
Among the difficulties with mcorporating the conscience-shocking
standard mto equal protection challenges to executive action Is the
Supreme Court's reluctance to sanction an mvestigation of mdiVIdual
motives under traditional equal protection doctrme. In 0/ech, the Supreme
Court did not rule out an assessment of motive, but rather declined to
consider whether the Seventh Circuit's "illegitimate animUs" theory was
VIable under the Equal Protection Clause.337 However, Justice Breyer
mdicated m his concurrence that the "added factor'' of subjective ill will
was necessary to confine the Court's holding to only a limited number of
cases.338 Without it, Justice Breyer recogniZed that courts may well be
presented with the question ''whether the simple and common mstance of
a faulty zonmg declSlon would VIolate the Equal Protection Clause."339
It IS true that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to examme the
subjective mtent ofgovernment officials, particularly legislators, when the
Equal Protection Clause IS mvoked.340 Tins reluctance IS based at least m

336

See J. MichaelMcGumness &LISa A. McGumnessParlagreco, The Reemergence ofSubstantive Due Process as a Constitutional Tort: Theory, Proof, and
Damages, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV 1129, 1152 (1990) ("While a smgle mcident may
certainly suffice to shock the conscience, perhaps the test IS more appropnately
"). See also Chnstina Brooks
applied to a course of govehunental conduct
Whitman, Emphaszzmg the Constitutional m Constitutional Torts, 72 Qu.-K.ENT
L. REV 661, 690 ( 1997) (stating that ''what IS special about constitutional law, and
distingwshes it from tort, IS its concern with 1nstitutional power, and therefore with
systenuc mJustice").
337
See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct 1073, 1075 (2000) (per
cunam).
338
Id. (Breyer, J., concumng).
339 Id.
340

See, e.g., UnitedStatesv.O'Bnen,391 U.S.367,383 (1968){"Thedecis10ns
of this court from the begmnmg lend no support whatever to the assumption that
the JUdiciary may restram the exerciSe of lawful power on the assumption that a
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part on the difficulty inherent m assessmg the motivations of a multimember legislative body. But as we have seen, the Court sometimes
mvalidates government actions under the Equal Protection Clause because
they are motivated by bare, mational ammus.341 These ''naked preference''
cases support application ofthe conscience-shocking standard to "class of
one'' clrums premised upon the Equal Protection Clause, because m such
cases there IS no legitimate purpose for the acts committed. Moreover, m
cases mvolvmg orchestrated campmgns of official harassment or retaliation, a detailed mqwry mto officials' motivations may not be necessary
More often than not, a campmgn of vengeance mvolvmg a senes of
malicious acts will speak for itself.
Democratic outputs should not be frequently set aside solely on the
ground that they were the result of illicit motives.342 Indeed, although the
Equal Protection Clause IS frequently mvoked to mvalidate state laws, the
Court has mvalidated only a mere handful of laws based upon illegitimate
purpose. Similarly, it may be assumed that executive conduct that smgles
out a person for harsh or retaliatory treatment that IS conscience-shocking
or egregious will be an exceptional occurrence. To mvalidate decisions m
such Isolated crrcumstances does not mter.Ject the courts mto the admrmstrative process other than under the most uruque and extraordinary
crrcumstances, as a Judicial check on government run amok. "Class of one"
cases limited by the "shocks the conscience" standard do not threaten to
embroil federal courts in local disputes ofall manner andcrrcumstance. For
example, the doctrine would not reach the run-of-the-mill zonmg decision.
Yet, a campmgn ofretaliation, like a legislative classification that purports
to deny to some group benefits afforded to all others by law, ''ralse[s] the
znevitable znforence that the disadvantage Imposed IS born of animosity
toward the [person] affected."343
The ''naked preference" cases and ''vmdictive action" cases share
another similarity. Both types ofcases Implicate the process theory ofequal
protection. Chief Judge Posner posited the mghtenmg prospect of an

wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.'') (citing McCray
v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)).
341
See supra Part IV.C.2.
342 The Supreme Court has cautioned agamst "broad rangmg" discovery to
determme the subjective good faith of government offictals. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982). But it has stopped short of prohibiting
such mqumes, relymg mstead upon the availability of early dispositive motions to
weed outnon-meritonous clauns. SeeCrawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
343 Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,634 (1996) (emphasis added).
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mdiVIdual who faces alone the VIndictive force of the government.344
Process theory plainly applies m the case of groups like homosexuals and
the mentally retarded. We may presume that therr legislative allies are few
or none; hence the need to scrutinize far more carefully the government's
stated purpose m enacting legislation that disfavors these groups. The same
can be said of indiVIduals who complam ofvtndictive or retaliatory action
by local admm1strators engaged m an orchestrated consprracy Although
not part of a vulnerable group that has lnstoncally been VIctimized, these
Isolated mdiVIduals are mdeed "relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
maJoritanan political process."345 They are, m Ely's words, disadvantaged
"out of simple hostility "346 What we should be concerned with m the
"vmdictive action" cases IS a malfunction of the political process m a
special form-not simply the bare animosity or naked hatred of a smgle
admmtstrator m an Isolated mstance, but rather a concerted effort by
government officials of vengeance or retaliation. This IS a structural
problem, not merely a random mistake m democratic output. While it may
be that the subjugated mdiVIdual can ultimately rally others to lns cause, a
political remedy-removal of the rogue adm1n1strator-will be entirely
meffectual, as the harm from the retaliation will have been done.
The Court has exercised very sparmgly its power to mvalidafe laws on
the ground that they are animated by an illegitimate purpose. It has done so
to protect the politically powerless from legislative ill will. While
concededly outside the onginal scope of footnote four of Carolene
Products,347 which concerned mstoncally subjugated and readily Identifiable mmorities, mdiVIduals who face alone a campaign of vengeance are
certainly politically powerless m the stnctest sense. Ifthe Equal Protection
Clause means anythmg, it IS that a legiSlature cannot enact laws that
margmalize or subJugate a vulnerable class of citizens merely because a
maJority ofthe lawmakers do not like them. Neither shouldrogue executive
officials be permitted to harass or retaliate agamst an mdiVIdual out ofbare
animUS.
Not every random act that disappomts an mdiVIdual ought to mvolve
the federal courts m constitutional mterpretation. But egregious cases of
governmental oppression are another matter entirely, no matter what the
344

See discusston supra Part ll.
San Antoruo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodnguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
346 ELY, supra note 175, at 103.
347
See United States v. Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also
supra note 174 and accompanymg text.
345
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race or gender of the VIctim. Such conduct does not "comport with
traditional1deas of fairplay anddecency,"348 Is "arbitrary'' m the constitutional sense, and IS thus properly the subJect of the equal protection
guarantee.
The cryptic discussion ofequal protectionm 0/ech likely will continue
to spawn confusion m the lower courts. In addition to providing some
mediating prmciple by wlnch to screen equal protection clrums, the focus
on egregtous, orchestrated retaliation would brmg doctrinal parity to "class
of one" cases by re-affirmmg that only the most outrageous official
miSconduct 1s of constitutional significance. By limiting the "class of one"
theory, the Supreme Court would reaffirm pnor precedents like Feeney3 49
and Wayte,350 wruch plamly requrre something more than a bare allegation
of arbitrary conduct. An mdiVIdual who claims to have been discharged
from employment m VIolation of the Equal Protection Clause still must
prove that dismissal was due to an mtent to discnmtnate agamst the
mdiVIdual because of membersrup m some group. In addition, clanns of
selective prosecution will continue to be limited pnmarily to challenges
agamst traditional group-based discnmtnation or retaliation for exercise of
a constitutional nght.351 Allegations of arbitrary derual of governmental
benefits will, m the mam, be the provmce of state and local adjudicative
bodies, which will generally be far closer to the disputes and, thus, better
able to resolve them.
VII. CONCLUSION

As the Seventh Circuit conceded m Esmai/,352 m rather understated
fasruon, protecting angry white males from allegedly unfarr government
treatment "is remote from the pnmary concern of the framers of the equal
protection clause."353 That observation does not, of course, prohibit an

348

Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957).
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1978).
350 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
351 Clauns of selective prosecution based on 0/ech would stand little chance of
success many event Wayte IS grounded upon the broad discretion afforded the
government m determmmg whom to prosecute. See zd. at 607 ("Tlus broad
discretion rests largely on the recognition that the dectston to prosecute ts
particularly ill-suited to JUdictal revtew.").
352
Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).
353
Id. at 180 (citing Strauderv. WestVirgmta, 100 U.S. 303,306-07 (1879),
and Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,220 (1971)).
349
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extension of equal protection doctnne, as the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence attests. Pnor to 0/ech, however, the Court was quite careful to limit
the reach ofthe Equal Protection Clause to prohibit only those governmental actions based upon tmpenmssible group-Identifying charactenstics.
0/ech brushes aside a century of equal protection Jurisprudence, but
proVIdes no useful mediating pnnciple for federal courts to apply As the
Court has emphasiZed, however, "executive action challenges ratse a
particular need to preserve the constitutional proportions of constitutional
clatms.m 54 0/ech fails to preserve that proportionality. By usurpmg state
law, the Court's mterpretation ofthe Equal Protection Clause demotes not
only the federal constitution, but also the state and local JUdictary
0/ech signals to all disappomted mdiVIduals that they have a constitutional clatm agamst therr government officials. The door to the federal
courthouse ought not be opened so wide. Except m the most egregtous
cases, mdiVIdual clatms of mistreatment ought to be set to one side under
the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has already fashioned a
mediating pnnciple to limit the scope of the so-called "class of one"
clatms. Under the Court's substantive due processJurisprudence, only those
executive acts that "shock the conscience" are constitutionally significant
and thus call for a federal remedy. All other cases are the provmce of state
law Unless 0/ech IS so limited, federal courts will be expounding not a
constitution, but a "font" of admwstrative law.

354

County of Sacramento v. LewiS, 523 U.S. 833, 847-48 n.8 (1998).

